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America today needs more from the legal profession. At a time
when most of our nation enjoys an historic level of prosperity and
comfort, we must devote special attention to those living on the
edge, those lacking adequate food or shelter, those addicted or men-
tally ill, those whose neighborhoods have been decimated by crime
and decay.
George Bush'
When compliance with the law becomes mainly a matter of form,
the law is made to appear ludicrous, legal administration is under-
mined, the underlying policy of the law may be subverted, and the
most conscientious bear the heaviest burden. And it is usually a
sign that the law is out of touch with reality.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers have a professional duty to provide service to the poor,
or to engage in other public service activities. The ethical rules al-
ways have encouraged such service activities; some jurisdictions are
beginning to impose mandatory duties. The federal government, how-
ever, heavily restricts the outside activities of its attorneys; existing
law governing these lawyers operates to discourage voluntary service
to those in need.
One barrier is 18 U.S.C. section 205, which prohibits federal
government lawyers from acting as agent or attorney in any matter in
which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial
interest.3 The statutory barrier is a historical accident resulting from
1. Bush, Light Up the World Around You, A.B.AJ., Feb. 1990, at 9.
2. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMlrrEM
ON TnE FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS, Comucr OF INTEREsT AND FEDERAL SER-
VICE 71 (1960).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1988). See infra notes 100-94 and accompanying text.
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contemporary application of language drafted in the mid-nineteenth
century to address other problems. Other barriers are imposed by
regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management and
other agencies, and by court and agency decisions that restrict the use
of government time and resources for pro bono work 4 Some of these
are the result of an effort during the Reagan administration to scale
back services to poor people. The various barriers prohibit some pro
bono work and set bureaucratic obstacles to the performance of per-
mitted pro bono work. Despite these problems, a small number of
federal government attorneys contribute time and effort to public
service beyond the time devoted to their government jobs.
The significant question is not the technical one of whether
government service satisfies the duty to do pro bono work, but
whether, as a matter of public policy, the federal government should
prohibit, permit or encourage its attorneys to donate some services to
indigent individuals or groups who need lawyers, or to participate in
other public service activities.
To ensure that the various missions of the federal government
are accomplished, the government must prohibit its attorneys from
engaging in outside activities that conflict, temporally or substantively,
with their official responsibilities. However, the government also
should seek to avoid overbroad restrictions on the activities of its
employees, and should encourage public service activities by all
Americans, including government employees. Therefore, the govern-
ment should permit and even encourage government lawyers to en-
gage in non-conflicting public service activities.5
The need for services is an important reason to allow pro bono
4. See infra notes 195-274 and accompanying text.
5. It might be urged that the federal government should require all of its attorneys to
undertake some pro bono representation, and that, absent a requirement, too few lawyers will
do pro bono work to provide any significant amount of service.
While requiring pro bono assistance undoubtedly would produce much more public
service than a permissive rule, at the present time it would be an unrealistic objective. The
Bush administration appears to be more sympathetic to the needs of the poor than the Rea-
gan administration, but any mandatory pro bono proposal nevertheless would generate im-
mense controversy.
A more constructive approach to the question at the present time is to examine
whether the current barriers to pro bono assistance are justified and, if not, to urge that law-
yers should not be constrained from doing public service simply because they are employed
by the federal government. If the administration wishes to encourage volunteer service (as is
suggested by statements like the one by the President quoted at the beginning of this article),
articulated government policy should encourage federal government lawyers to undertake per-
missible pro bono work.
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service. Most poor people who need lawyers are not represented.
Esther Lardent, an expert on lawyer pro bono work, reports that stud-
ies of unmet legal needs "consistently find that only between 15-20%
of the critical needs of low income persons presently are being
met."6 A 1988 survey in Maryland indicated that a low-income
household typically experiences over three legal problems each year.7
Legal services programs are able to assist less than one fifth of those
in need.' The A.B.A. Journal reported that Legal Services lawyers
represent only 6.1 percent of indigents who need assistance; the pri-
vate bar involvement program provides representation for .7 percent
of those in need; 93.2 percent of needed legal services are not per-
formed by anyone.9
While most poor people who need lawyers are unrepresented,
public funding for legal services has been cut in recent years, making
the problem of unmet needs even more acute. From 1981 to 1989,
the funding for the Legal Services Corporation was reduced by forty
percent per capita (adjusted for inflation).1" And despite frequent
encouragement to do pro bono work, most of those in private practice
provide little or no service without pay."
6. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 78, 86 n.22 (1990) (citing CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION,
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT, NORTH DAKOTA TRIAL LAwYERS* ASSOCIATION, A WORK-
ABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: A PRACTICAL, EQUITABLE AND PO-
LITICAL PROPOSAL FOR BAR LEADERSHIP (1988); COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY
OF LEGAL SERVICES, PRE.miARY REPORT TO THE CHmF JUDGE OF TnE STATE OF NEW
YORK (1989)).
Deborah Rhode reports that "the Legal Services Corporation projected that persons
below the official poverty line would encounter between 6 and 132 million legal problems in
1980, while Corporation-funded offices could handle at most 2 million matters." Rhode, Why
the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 700
(1981).
7. MARYLAND LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, ACTION PLAN FOR
LEGAL SERVICES TO MARYLAND'S POOR (1988) cited in Cardin & Rhudy, Expanding Pro
Bono Legal Assistance in Civil Cases to Maryland's Poor, 49 MD. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1990).
8. IA at 6.
9. Born, Serving the Poor, A.B.AJ., Mar. 1988, at 144 (estimating that there were
18,452,665 unserved legal problems, that .1,197,668 cases were handled annually by legal
services lawyers, and that 141,667 cases were handled through the private bar involvement
program). These figures appear to include only civil cases.
10. Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 7, at 4.
11. In one 1975 survey, three fifths of the lawyers surveyed spent less than five percent
of their billable hours on pro bono work. Half of this group did no pro bono work. Most of
the pro bono work that was done was for relatives and friends. Most of the rest was done
for organizations that serve middle class people. Handler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger & Ladinsky,
The Public Interest Activities of Private Practice Lawyers, 61 A.B.AJ. 1388-89 (Nov. 1975).
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These statistics compel the observation that legal services for the
poor cannot be provided effectively by pro bono services. The gov-
ernment must assume responsibility for providing free lawyers to the
poor, and the funding for such lawyers must be greatly increased. At
present, legal services lawyers cannot even staff all of the emergency
cases in which the safety or the health of a client is threatened. The
statistics place pro bono activity in a different prespective; the thou-
sand points of light may help many individuals, but in this arena they
cannot begin to solve a major social problem.
The need for services is so enormous that any effort to encour-
age government lawyers to do pro bono work may not even make a
dent in the existing need for legal services.12 In 1985, there were
about 20,300 lawyers employed by the federal government; this group
constitutes only 3.1 percent of the lawyers in the United States. 13 At
present, it appears that only a small number of federally employed
lawyers wish to do pro bono work. 4 Even if the number increased,
each lawyer is likely to contribute only a small number of hours of
service. The overall impact on the problem of unmet needs is likely
to be statistically invisible.
If the government lawyers cannot help very many poor people,
why bother encouraging pro bono work? In an environment of such
tremendous need, any unnecessary barrier to efforts to serve the dis-
advantaged should be removed. Suppose that ten percent of the feder-
al bar represented one client per year. If (for purposes of analysis)
each handled one child support enforcement matter, the possibility of
adequate financial support would increase for thousands of American
children. Perhaps the numbers would be insignificant, but the benefit
to those assisted would be immeasurable.
A second reason to encourage public interest work by govern-
ment lawyers is to assist the professional development of the individ-
ual lawyers. Most federal agencies have specialized functions. Their
12. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 698 (criticizing the 40 hour a year proposal in the
original Model Rules).
13. B. CURRAN, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT. THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION iN 1985 (1986).
14. Most of the lawyers I interviewed reported that they knew at most one or two other
federal government lawyers who had ever done any pro bono work. I called several organiza-
tions that distribute pro bono work to volunteer attorneys; when asked whether they had
volunteer attorneys who worked for the federal government, they reported at most a few
participants. Perhaps if the barriers to participation were reduced, more lawyers would under-
take pro bono assistance, but it is unlikely that the numbers would change dramatically ab-
sent a mandatory pro bono requirement.
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attorneys work in narrow areas of law. Encouraging them to take on
limited outside activities consistent with their official responsibilities
would allow them to learn about other areas of law or types of prac-
tice. Pro bono work may offer better opportunities for litigation expe-
rience than exist within their own agencies. The attorneys would grow
as professionals from contact with other institutions and with other
legal problems than those presented in their daily work.
The exposure that government lawyers would gain through pro
bono activities would encourage a greater commitment to public ser-
vice, by asking each attorney to think about how he or she might
contribute to solving a problem in the community. This might make
continued public service activity more likely even among those law-
yers who move into the private sector.
A third reason that the federal government should permit pro
bono work by government attorneys is that a more permissive policy
would offer a significant improvement in work conditions at a negli-
gible cost."5 Many lawyers regard opportunities to do public service
work as an important fringe benefit of a job. 6 It is a modicum of
professional freedom, an opportunity to pursue a public issue of per-
sonal concern. The permission to engage in such activities 'is likely to
increase the job satisfaction of government lawyers, and may increase
the length of their government service. Lawyers are more useful to
their institutions if they have substantial experience in the perfor-
mance of their duties. Rapid turnover has high economic costs be-
cause of time lost in training and expertise lost by departure of expe-
15. I have not attempted to estimate the actual cost of the recommendations that con-
clude the report. The assertion that the cost is low assumes that government lawyers would
not take on work that would interfere with or increase the cost of their performance of their
official responsibilities. It assumes that they would be able to make limited use of govem-
ment resources (desks, phones, computers, paper, pens, etc.) but that no significant expenses
would be paid out of taxpayer dollars.
16. See Pro Bono Representation by Employees of the Federal Government and the
District of Columbia: Hearings on H.R. 4898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House of Representive Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess. 57-58 (1986) (statement of Stanley Fisher, President-Elect, Federal Bar Associ-
ation):
I think every major law firm today has come to recognize that the graduating
lawyers are interested in having the opportunity of providing pro bono service to
the public. We, in turn, have found that by encouraging our attorneys to engage in
pro bono activities, and giving them the opportunity to do so, helps our recruit-
ment and retention of young lawyers. I know the same would be true of Govern-
ment service attorneys.
[Vl. 19:1141
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rienced employees. In the legal profession, private sector wages have
far outstripped government salaries; the government faces obstacles in
attracting and keeping qualified lawyers. A more permissive pro bono
policy is one step that the government can take to make public law
careers attractive.
A fourth reason to encourage pro bono work by federal govern-
ment lawyers is that the federal government should seek to create
within itself a model for the private bar of public-spirited law prac-
tice.17 Attorneys in private practice have difficulty fitting pro bono
work in with their other responsibilities, especially if their law fimns
are not supportive toward attorneys who make the effort."8 Many
firms do not encourage pro bono efforts, because usually pro bono
hours displace billable hours.' 9 The possibility of institutional sup-
port is much greater in non-profit organizations.20
A final reason to permit pro bono work by government attorneys
is that to do otherwise might infringe on the attorneys' rights of free
expression or free association, and the rights of their hypothetical
clients.2
1
17. Cf. S. KELmAN, MAKING PuBuc POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AmEBPCAN GOV-
ERNMENT 263 (1987) (observing widespread public-spiritedness within the government, and
urging that "government is seen as an appropriate forum for the display of the concern for
others that so many people wish to show").
18. I interviewed one lawyer in private practice who had been ordered by a partner in
his law firm to spend the entire day before a trial in a pro bono case working on a matter
for a paying client. This deprived him of the opportunity to do essential preparation for trial
in the pro bono case. He was distressed about the low priority accorded to non-paying clients
by his firm. Interview with anonymous lawyer (summer 1988)
Some private law firms offer institutional support for pro bono work by counting pro
bono hours as part of a lawyer's total number of billable hours, by hiring staff to assist and
coordinate pro bono efforts, and by establishing a policy that clients are entitled to the same
quality of service whether they are paying for representation or not. See Lindon & Hoffman,
Pro Bono: Can it Survive the Bottom Line?, WASH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 26.
19. See Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 665 (1989) (discussing
growing pressure in law firms to bill increasing numbers of hours and corresponding rapid
growth in lawyers' incomes).
20. See Lardent, supra note 6, at 90-91 (discussing the economics of law practice for
private law firms).
21. For a discussion of this issue, see Memorandum from Chris Melcher to the Wash-
ington Council of Lawyers (July 12, 1988) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) (citing R.
Dworkin, RiGnrs OF THE PuBLIc EMPLOYEE (1978); R. O'NEL, RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (1978) (ACLU Handbook); F. HAMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1981)).
In In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978), the Supreme Court found, in a different
context, that a lawyer's offer to represent a client for the purpose of furthering political and
ideological goals was a constitutionally protected associational activity. There the Court stated
that "'broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration
1991]
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Another question raised by current statutory restrictions is wheth-
er federal government lawyers should be permitted to represent indi-
gent clients in matters in which the United States has an interest, but
that do not pose a conflict of interest with the attorneys' official
duties. One reason to allow such work is that such representation
usually assists in the efficient operation of some other organ of the
federal government. Federal administrative and judicial officers usual-
ly prefer that claimants and litigants be represented by counsel so that
proceedings move more quickly and smoothly. When the litigant has
counsel, the judge need not spend time explaining the process to the
claimant. The determination of facts is easier when a professional
presents a case. If some federal government attorneys wish to do pro
bono work, it is arguably a waste of valuable resources for the gov-
ernment to disallow them from representation that would assist anoth-
er government agency.
There are potential problems with allowing government lawyers
to engage in pro bono work. One is that pro bono work may present
conflicts of interest with government lawyers' official duties.2 While
present law may sweep too broadly in its prohibitions, some conduct
would pose real conflicts of interest and must be prohibited. Some
federal managers believe that the current rule prohibiting nearly all
pro bono representation against the United States should be main-
tained because of the difficulty of anticipating conflicts in some cases
and the time required to screen for conflicts. 3 In certain sections of
the Justice Department and in some other agencies, lawyers work on
matters that affect many other agencies. These lawyers should be
precluded from a wider range of pro bono activity than many other
lawyers. Some representation against the government might result in
the making of law that would have a broad impact on the govern-
ment and might involve an unanticipated conflict.
24
of justice' must not work a significant impairment of 'the value of associational freedoms.'"
The court found that a letter offering representation to a prospective client by an ACLU
lawyer was protected speech. Id. at 425.
This decision suggests that some lawyering activity is protected by the first amend-
ment. The question is whether this continues to be the case if the lawyer in question works
for the federal government and the activity is outside of her normal responsibilities.
22. As discussed infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text, what is a conflict of interest
depends on how the client entity is defined, so this question is somewhat circular.
23. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, Ch. 990, Appendix A, Statement by the Federal
Legal Council in Opposition to Amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 205 (Mar. 14, 1985).
24. This concern was raised in discussions of pro bono policy by members of ACUS
during meetings in 1990.
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The question underlying the concern about conflicts of interest is
whether pro bono service will harm government interests. A tradition-
al approach is to regard the government as a monolithic entity with
one coherent set of interests, ' and to regard any adversity to the
government as against the government's interest. A more realistic
model of the federal government must recognize the diverse and often
conflicting interests among parts of the government. Conflicts between
agencies and within agencies occur frequently, and are an inevitable
product of the process of policy making. Those who single out pro
bono work as a source of serious conflicts may be forgetting that our
government exists in part to help people in need, and that poor peo-
ple are not the adversaries of the federal government.
If government lawyers engage in some outside activities, care
must be taken that those activities do not interfere with their official
duties. A final problem presented by a permissive pro bono policy is
the need to protect federal resources, both personnel and other re-
sources, from unauthorized use. 6 The government lawyers whom the
author interviewed about their pro bono activities consistently reported
no problems with impairment of their primary professional activities,
and that they used only de minimis amounts of government resources.
A more flexible policy on pro bono work will yield significant
benefits to society, the bar, government attorneys and their agencies.
Possible harms can be avoided by developing guidelines and by con-
tinuing to require government lawyers to consult with their supervi-
sors about anticipated projects.
This article reviews current federal policy on pro bono work.
Part II examines the duty imposed on lawyers to serve the poor, and
the application of that duty to federal government lawyers.' Part III
discusses the question of who is the government lawyer's client in
order to identify pro bono activities that present conflicts of interest
and, therefore, should be prohibited. Part IV looks at the current
statutory restrictions on pro bono work by federal government law-
yers, and reveals the essentially accidental genesis of the current
25. Cf G. ALLISON, THE ESSENCE OF DEcISION (1971) (describing three models of
government decisionmaking, the first of which is to regard the government as a single unified
entity).
26. See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text (setting forth recommendations on
screening procedures, leave policy, resources and support staff).
27. See infra notes 33-70 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 63-99 and accompanying text.
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statutory prohibition.29 Part V describes the array of regulatory re-
strictions on pro bono activities, and points out the considerable im-
pact of the Reagan administration in restricting pro bono legal servic-
es to the poor." Part VI reports some conversations with govern-
ment attorneys who have done pro bono work while working for the
government." This section aids in understanding the effect of the
current legal restrictions, and the difficulties experienced by federal
government lawyers who wish to do pro bono work. In part VII, this
article concludes with recommendations for change in current federal
policy.
3 2
1H. THE DUTY TO Do PRO BONO WORK
A. Lawyers' Duty to Do Pro Bono Work
For at least the last 150 years, some lawyers have urged that
each member of the profession has an obligation to provide services
to those who cannot afford to pay.3 In 1908 the ABA adopted a
recommended oath of admission to practice for lawyers, including a
promise that each lawyer "will never reject, from any consideration
personal to [himself], the cause of the defenseless or oppressed."'
The Model Code of Professional Conduct, adopted by the ABA in
1970, stated that the "basic responsibility for providing legal services
for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer
.... Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or
professional work load, should find time to participate in serving the
disadvantaged.
35
In 1975 the ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution that "it
is a basic professional responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the
practice of law to provide public interest legal services".36 This poli-
29. See infra notes 100-94 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 195-294 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 298-314 and accompanying text.
33. See D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY, RESOLUTION XVIII (2d ed. 1836),
reprinted in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS at 5 (1953).
34. Christensen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. L 1, 7 (quoting H. DRINER LEGAL ETHIcs at 5 (1953)).
35. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1985) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
36. Lawyers' Responsibility to Provide Public Interest Practice, reprinted In SPECIAL
COMM. ON PUBLIC INTREST PRACTICE OF THE A.B.A., IMPLEMENTING THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC
INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATION (1977).
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cy was then expressed in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 7 adopted by the ABA in 1983, which provide that "[a] lawyer
should render public interest legal service," and then define public
interest legal service as "professional services at no fee or a reduced
fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable
groups or organizations, by service in activities for improving the
law, the legal system or the legal profession, and by financial support
for organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited
means."38 While this rule presents a vigorous endorsement of the
notion that all lawyers should do pro bono work, it falls short of
requiring pro bono service.39
Another Model Rule addressing pro bono responsibilities is Rule
6.2, which imposes a duty "not [to] seek to avoid appointment by a
tribunal to represent a person except for good cause ... ..4 This
37. The Model Rules were written under the sponsorship of the American Bar Associa-
tion and were presented to the states for possible adoption in 1983. To date, they have been
adopted by approximately thirty states. Fewer than twenty states continue to use some version
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which is the predecessor of the Model
Rules. The Model Code was approved by the ABA in 1970, and had been adopted in all but
a few states by 1973. S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND
STANDARDS vii, 201 (1989).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1989) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
39. The initial exhortation of this rule says "should" rather than "shall", the latter being
the word used in the Model Rules to denote a mandatory duty. See Id. at 7 (noting the dis-
tinction between imperative and permissive language). The rule appears to encourage but not
require the performance of pro bono work by members of the bar. The absence of the word
"shall" signifies that violation of this rule would not be a basis for disciplinary action. The
comments following the rule explain that "[t]his Rule . . . is not intended to be enforced
through disciplinary process." Id at Rule 6.1 comment.
The original draft of the Model Rules would have imposed a mandatory duty. It stat-
ed that "[a] lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service." Christensen, The
Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1. The original
draft of the Model Rules proposed a mandatory annual minimum commitment of forty hours
of work for no pay or reduced pay. Even this modest requirement was met by vehement
opposition by the bar, so it was deleted and an annual reporting requirement was substituted.
Rhode, supra note 12 at 698.
The MODEL CODE likewise imposed no mandatory duty to do pro bono work, but
urged that each lawyer had a responsibility to and should "participate in serving the disad-
vantaged." MODEL CODE supra note 35 at EC 2-25 (1986); see id. at EC 8-9 (noting that a
lawyer's role in the advancement of the legal system entails maling needed changes and
improvements where necessary); id. at EC 8-3 (stressing the importance of the availability of
lawyers to effect the fair administration of justice).
40. MODEL RULES supra note 38, at Rule 6.2 (1989). In Mallard v. District Court, 490
U.S. 296 (1989), the Supreme Court interpreted a federal statute allowing courts to appoint
attorneys to represent indigents, in response to a lawyer who rejected such an appointment.
The Supreme Court found that the statute allowed the court to request, but not to compel,
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rule states that it is not a violation to refuse to accept an appointment
as counsel if accepting the appointment would violate the Model
Rules or other law.4'
The Model Rules, like the earlier ABA resolution, define pro
bono work to include a wide range of service activities, including
representation of indigents and bar association work.42 The new Dis-
trict of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct, in contrast, define
pro bono publico service as the representation of those who are un-
able to obtain counsel, or the support of organizations that provide
such representation.43 The D.C. definition reflects a judgment that
the need for services to unrepresented indigents is so great that each
attorney should undertake representational work on a pro bono basis
every year."
Much is said and written about the supposed duty to do pro
bono work,45 but relatively little service to the poor is provided by
members of the bar other than those few who work for legal services
organizations.
46
such representation. Id. at 301.
41. For example, the appointment of a federal government attorney to represent an indi-
gent criminal defendant would contravene 18 U.S.C. section 205 (1988). MoDEL RULES OF
PRoEmssiONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1989) also provides that a lawyer may decline an appoint-
ment when acceptance would result in an unreasonable financial burden, or when the client
or cause "is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relation-
ship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client."
42. President Bush appears to advocate an even broader definition, including non-legal
with legal service. See Bush, supra note 1, at 9 (exhorting lawyers to implement a compre-
hensive regime of public service).
43. D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1991) [hereinafter D.C. RULES].
44. Id. The conments to Rule 6.1 provide that lawyers should accept one court appoint-
ment each year or provide 40 hours of pro bono publico legal service, or "when personal
representation is not feasible, contribute the lesser of $200 or I % of earned income to a
legal assistance organization which services the community's economically disadvantaged." Id.
at comment 5.
45. Compare Christensen, supra note 39 (advocating a mandatory system of pro bono
service) with Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735
(1980) (arguing that the pro bono responsibility should derive solely from the ethical aspim-
tions of the attorney).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10. In Washington, D.C., for example, over
forty percent of 800 large firm lawyers surveyed by the Washington Council of Lawyers
performed twenty or fewer hours of pro bono service (which was broadly defined) each year.
Torry, D.C. Lawyers Lag in Work for Poor, Wash. Post, October 1, 1990, at D1, col. 3. The
results of this survey are reported in more detail in Lindon & Hoffman, supra note 18. See
Handler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger & Ladinsky, supra note 11 at 1388. (arguing that the bulk
of the private bar's pro bono work comes not from large fins, but from solo practitioners,
and that this contribution is rarely aimed at challenging the status quo).
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B. Federal Government Lawyers' Duty
The ethical rules encouraging lawyers to do pro bono work state
no exception for government lawyers. At several points the comments
specifically note that all lawyers are subject to these duties. The Fed-
eral Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct for Fed-
eral Lawyers47 offer guidance to lawyers working for the federal
government. These rules, however, have only advisory status,48 un-
like the ethics codes adopted by each state, which have the force of
law. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for Federal Lawyers
track the language of the ABA Model Rules on pro bono assis-
tance,49 except that the relevant rule also includes a provision urging
government lawyers to provide pro bono assistance in a manner that
comports with applicable law."0
The D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct are of particular impor-
tance to federal government attorneys, because over half of the law-
yers employed by the federal government practice in the District of
Columbia. The D.C. Rules explain that the obligation imposed by
Rule 6.1 is not "intended to place any obligation on a government
lawyer that is inconsistent with the laws such as 18 U.S.C. sections
203 and 205 limiting the scope of permissible employment or repre-
sentational activities."51 To the extent not precluded by other law,
the rule is intended to apply to lawyers in government as well as
those in private practice.
Despite the relative clarity of the rules, there has been some
disagreement in the legal community about whether federal govern-
ment lawyers are subject to the rules, and, if so, whether federal
government lawyers' duty to do pro bono work is satisfied by their
performance of their regular responsibilities.
The first of these questions asks who has the authority to regu-
late lawyers who are employed by the federal government. The courts
traditionally have asserted the exclusive authority to regulate the prac-
47. FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PRoFESsIONAL CoNDucT FOR FEDER-
AL LAWYERS (1990) [hereinafter FBA MODEL RULES].
48. it at 1 (stating that "[tihe FBA is not empowered to discipline members or enforce
these Rules").
49. Id. at Rule 6.1. See also Poirier, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional
Ethics, 60 A.B.A.J. 1541 (1974) (discussing the 1973 Supplemental Federal Ethical Consider-
ations).
50. PBA MODEL RULES, supra note 47, at Rule 6.1(b) (1990).
51. D.C. RULES, supra note 43, at Rule 6.1 comment 4.
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tice of law under the inherent powers doctrine, 2 and have some-
times struck down legislation regulating the conduct of lawyers as an
interference with their exclusive authority.53 Under this doctrine, law-
yers are subject to the rules of the court that issued their license to
practice law, regardless of who employs them.' The highest court of
each state ordinarily adopts ethical rules that govern members of the
state bar, and determines standards for admission to the bar.55 The
federal courts formally have separate ethical rules and rules on admis-
sion to practice, but on both matters they tend to adapt the standards
set by the highest court of the state in which each federal court is
located.56
A federal government lawyer cannot practice law unless he or
she is licensed by a state bar.57 In most states, admission to practice
is predicated on obtaining a law degree, passing a bar exam, and
satisfying the bar as to one's moral character. A lawyer admitted to
the bar commits herself to comply with the ethical rules promulgated
by the state in which she is admitted. The regulatory structure con-
templates no exemption for those employed by the federal govern-
ment.
The proposition that government lawyers are governed by the
state codes of ethics was challenged by Deputy Attorney General
Harold Christensen in 1988.58 In comments on the proposed new
ethics code for the District of Columbia, Christensen took the position
that the federal government has the exclusive authority to regulate its
lawyers, and that the ethics rules were merely advisory.59 Other fed-
eral officials took the same position. Robert Jordan, past president of
the D.C. Bar, however, characterized Christensen's position as "hog-
wash."0 Christensen's effort to place federal government lawyers
52. See generally WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 22 (1986).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 31 (discussing regulation by trial courts); see also The Judiciary Act of
1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1988) (authorizing federal courts to regulate lawyers who appear
before them).
55. See WOLFRAM, supra note 52, at 24.
56. Id. at 24, 58.
57. See E. FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED
STATES 21 (1983) (discussing the regulation of the legal profession); D. MELUNKOFF, LAW-
YERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 132 (1976) (discussing federal practice requirements).
58. Pendlebury, Bar Agencies Haggle over Defining 'Client': For Whom Does the Gov-
ernment Lawyer Toll?, Legal Times, Nov. 14, 1988 at 17.
59. Id.
60. Id
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outside of the structure that governs all lawyers is inconsistent with
all of the ethical rules discussed earlier in this section.61
Another question raised by the officials in the Reagan adminis-
tration is whether the duty to perform pro bono work is satisfied by
the federal attorneys' performance of their regular responsibilities. In
1985 the Office of Personnel Management advanced the argument that
working for the federal government might satisfy the lawyers' duty to
do pro bono work.62 Since government lawyers' work is by defini-
tion intended to benefit the people of the United States, this work
benefits "persons of limited means". 63 It is for a public service orga-
nization (the government), and it is intended to "improve the law, and
the legal profession . . .,,"
On the other hand, some federal officials have taken the position
that federal government lawyers have as much responsibility as the
private bar to provide legal services to those in need, and to partici-
pate in bar and other activities designed to improve the legal sys-
tem.65 The former president of the District of Columbia Bar urged
61. The Federal Bar Association takes the position that:
Federal lawyers shall be thoroughly acquainted with and shall adhere at all times
to the rules of professional responsibility adopted by the Federal Agency that em-
ploys them or before which they practice. In the absence of Federal Agency rules,
they should comply with the rules of the state bars in which they are licensed to
practice.
FBA MODEL RULES, supra note 47, at Preface. This rather ambiguous statement should be
interpreted to mean that a federal agency rule on a particular topic preempts a state rule
addressing the same topic.
62. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at Ch. 990, Subch. 2-2(a) (Pro Bono
Publico Services By Federal Government Attorneys).
63. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing the MODEL RULES' defini-
tion of public interest legal service).
64. MODEL CODE supra note 35, at 6.
65. Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia spoke to the Federal Bar Association on March 8, 1990, and urged that, since
there are so many cases in which litigants cannot afford counsel, all attorneys should accept
pro bono representation of indigents. He pointed out that 40 percent of the cases in his court
do not involve the government as a party and would pose no conflict for federal government
attorneys.
At the same meeting, James F. Hinchman, General Counsel of the General Accounting
Office, echoed these sentiments, urging that -the federal government has not been very
friendly to this type of activity [pro bono work]" and that the need for participation is in-
creasing. He urged that federal agencies should be less grudging about use of time and
should be more trusting that its attorneys will give the proper time and effort to their regular
responsibilities. He suggested that they should be allowed to shift time to a pro bono project
during one week and make up the time another week. He also suggested that agencies might
be more creative in determining whether a pro bono project supports the work of the govern-
ment, pointing out that some bar activities related to the mission of the agency could be
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that federal government lawyers should be encouraged to do pro bono
work outside of their regular duties:
If membership in the legal profession includes an obligation to
improve the administration of justice, to assist in providing legal
services to the poor, and more broadly to serve the community, that
is an obligation that attaches, without distinction, to those employed
in the private and in the public sectors. Moreover, if only out of
self-interest, government agencies should understand that they will
benefit from their lawyers' professional development and their in-
creased stature in the Bar, and from the community's perception
that they are committed to public service beyond their public em-
ployment.'
Each state bar has its own rules regarding the pro bono obliga-
tion, and none exempts federal government lawyers. District of Co-
lumbia Bar officials have given more attention to the question of pro
bono work by federal government attorneys than have other state
bars, because of the large population of federal employees.67 Their
analysis of the issue offers guidance for other jurisdictions where this
issue has been less fully explored.
Rules on pro bono work by state government lawyers provide
another model for policy on federal attorney pro bono work. Two
states have statutes that specifically permit lawyers employed by the
State Attorney Generals to engage in pro bono assistance.6" The
highest courts of both New York and Maryland have taken the posi-
tion that all lawyers licensed to practice in the state, including gov-
treated as part of a lawyer's official responsibilities.
Hinchman noted that the Comptroller General decisions have been quite consistent in
their restrictions on the use of government time and resources for pro bono work, but, he
said, within the boundaries imposed by those decisions, the agencies should be more accom-
modating and flexible.
Also at the same meeting, John Kominski, General Counsel of the Library of Con-
gress, added his voice to this chorus of support for pro bono activity. He pointed out that
"riln serving a pro bono client, you are serving the system and the court." He personally of-
fered to help federal government lawyers in the audience to identify appropriate pro bono
projects.
66. Ruff, Government Lawyers Under Restraint, 4 WASH. LAW. 6 (1989) (criticizing
federal agencies "with at best, unclear and at worst, unduly restrictive policies about engaging
in bar activity during the workday").
67. Pro Bono Representation By Employees of the Federal Government and the District
of Columbia, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Divil Liberties, and the Administration
of Justice, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) (statement by Hon. Carlos 3. Moorhead).
68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-14-02(4) (1960 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
43.10.010, 43.10.115 (West 1983 & Supp.1990).
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eminent lawyers, have the obligation to do pro bono work. In both
states the courts have undertaken initiatives to increase pro bono
participation through encouragement of voluntary efforts. If these do
not succeed, mandatory requirements may be imposed. 9 The At-
torney General of California established a policy encouraging partici-
pation of lawyers employed by the Attorney General's office in "bona
fide legal service programs."7" These initiatives demonstrate growing
recognition that every member of the bar should make a contribution
to the representation of those who cannot afford lawyers.
Im. DEFINING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
FOR GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
A. In General
To determine what pro bono activity should be prohibited to
government lawyers, one must identify which pro bono activities are
in conflict with the interests of the government attorney's client. In
order to identify the conflicts, it is first necessary to identify the
client.7 Traditionally the client was regarded as the entire govern-
ment.72 Recent developments reflect that this definition is too broad
and that a more appropriate standard is to regard the government
attorney's client as his or her agency.73
Section 205 of Title 18 defines the federal government attorney's
"client" as the United States government. Representation of a client
against the U.S. by a federal government attorney is punishable as a
crime under the statute. For example, the law requires a lawyer for
69. Cardin & Rhudy, supra note 7, at 13-17 (describing the Maryland initiative to en-
courage pro bono service, and the possibility of a mandatory rule if the voluntary initiative is
ineffective); Milleman, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right
Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 18, 56 n.194 (1990) (describing the New York proposal that every
lawyer licensed in the state, including government lawyers, be required to perform at least 40
hours of pro bono service every two years); COMMITTE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF
LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT TO THE CH]EF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (April
1990), reprinted in 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1991) (endorsing the mandatory pro bono
proposal) [hereinafter THE MARRERO REPORT].
70. Memorandum and attachments from John Van de Kamp, Attorney General of Cali-
fornia, to All Attorneys, re Pro Bono Policy (September 19, 1984) (on file at Hofstra Law
Review).
71. Professor Robert Lawry points out that the significant question is not who is the
client: Whoever is not the client must be put at arms length, so the better question is who
should be put at arms length. Lawry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer?
An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37 FED. B.J 61 (1978).
72. Id.
73. See D.C. RULES, supra note 43, at Rule 1.6 (i).
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the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to be as loyal to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as to her own agen-
cy and therefore not to take a position contrary to the interests of the
INS. So, an FERC employee is prohibited from representing an indi-
vidual seeking to avoid deportation by INS.
When section 205 was enacted in 1853, the notion of the federal
government as one discrete client entity was more plausible because
the federal government was quite small, employing approximately
36,500 people.74 By contrast, in 1991 the federal government's civil-
ian workforce included 3 million people, 80 times the size of the
1859 government.75 In 1859 the government seems to have been
primarily occupied with delivering mail and collecting taxes. In 1990,
the functions of the federal government are almost as broad as those
of the private sector.
The question is whether there is any continuing reason to define
the government attorney's client so broadly. The argument for doing
so is centered in some notion of abstract loyalty to the government as
a whole, or to the United States in general, and on some abstract
harm that might result if a government employee takes a position
adverse to the government. This traditional view is premised on an
adversarial model of conflict resolution in which each case is pre-
sumed to have two diametrically opposed interests. This model does
not fully describe the relationships of parties and tribunals in cases in
which lawyers represent indigent clients. Even, and perhaps especially,
if the lawyer is a zealous advocate for her client, the lawyer is pro-
viding a significant administrative service to the court or agency in
74. For example, in 1859 there were five civil officers employed by the Attorney
General's office. Letter from the Attorney General, S. EXuc. Doe. No. 82, 44th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1876). This number, and those listed for other agencies, did not include "laborers or
mechanics employed by the day, or contractors." Id. 30,817 people were employed by the
Post-Office Department (including over 28,500 postmasters). Letter from the Postmaster Gener-
al, S. EXEC. Doe. No. 83, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876). 339 people were employed by the
War Department. Letter from the Secretary of War, S. ExEc. Doc No. 86, 44th Cong., lst
Sess. (1876). 1,081 were employed by the Interior Department. Letter from the Acting Secre-
tary of the Interior, S. EXEC. Doe No. 87, 44th Cong. Ist Sess. (1876). 90 people were
employed by the Navy Department. Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, S. EXEc. Doc.
No. 89, 44th Cong. Ist Sess.(1876). 3,778 were employed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, S. EXEC. Doe. No. 91, 44th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1876). 367 people were employed by the Department of State. Message from the President
of the United States, S. EXEC. Doe. No. 92, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876). If (as appears to
be the case from the records) this covers all the federal agencies, the total number of em-
ployees was approximately 36,477.
75. Causey, On-the-Job Activities, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1991, at D2.
['Vol. 19:1141
PUBLIC SERVICE BY PUBLIC SERVANTS
which the case is pending, because it is so difficult to process pro se
cases.
If the case is a request for public benefits, such as social securi-
ty disability benefits, it is not adversarial in any traditional sense; if
the person is legally entitled to receive benefits, it is not against the
interest of the government for those benefits to be paid. Indeed, Con-
gress has made a decision that it is in the government's interest to
pay benefits to certain people. If the case is appealed to federal court
and another federal government lawyer is representing the Social
Security Administration, the case becomes formally adversarial.76 But
even in this setting, the purpose of the proceeding is to determine
whether an individual is entitled to benefits, and a decision for the
claimant is not really against the government.
Other cases also challenge the traditional model. If a lawyer
undertakes representation of a prisoner in a habeas corpus action that
would otherwise be handled by the claimant pro se, the lawyer be-
comes an intermediary between the petitioner and the government,
helping each to understand the other. In addition to the practical
assistance offered to judges, prosecutors, court clerks and other feder-
al officials by lawyers handling pro bono claims, this representation is
in the interest of the United States on a more abstract level because
the lawyer is helping an indigent person to obtain proper consider-
ation of a request. If a lawyer files comments on a proposed agency
rule on behalf of a client, the matter is not an adversarial case at all;
the lawyer is helping a client to participate in democratic government
decision-making, and helping the government to make a well-in-
formed decision.
A contemporary definition of the "client" of a government law-
yer is provided by the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.6(i), which has no counterpart in the Model Rules. It states that
"[tihe client of the government lawyer is the agency that employs the
lawyer unless expressly provided to the contrary by appropriate law,
regulation or order."'
76. At the administrative level the claimant, with or without counsel, appears before an
administrative law judge, who hears evidence and asks questions. No one presents the
government's case.
77. D.C. RULES, supra note 43, at Rule 1.6(i). Another pertinent provision is Rule 1.13,
which states that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organiza-
tion acting through its duly authorized constituents." The comment says "[b]ecause the gov-
ernment agency which employs the government lawyer is the lawyer's client, the lawyer
represents the agency through its duly authorized constituents." Id. at Rule 1.13.
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This rule reflects the careful consideration given to this question
by a committee appointed by the Board of Governors of the D.C.
Bar.7' As with the rules on pro bono work, the D.C. Bar paid close
attention to the impact of the rules defining the client on government
lawyers. The committee considered defining the government attorney's
client as the public interest, the official supervising each lawyer, the
American people, or the United States government as a whole, and
concluded that "the employing agency should in normal circumstances
be considered the client of the government lawyer."'79
The D.C. Bar committee emphasized that the government lawyer
should serve the public, and define her obligations in accordance with
law, rather than in accordance with "the whims of persons momen-
tarily in the executive branch."" From a functional perspective,
however, the committee was concerned that this abstract definition of
duty would not provide adequate constraint upon or guidance to gov-
ernment lawyers. The committee rejected the possibility of defining
the client as the entire United States government. It is useful to de-
fine the agency as the client because it is "a discrete entity, clearly
definable and the source of identifiable lines of authority .... The
lawyer's explicit responsibilities will be limited to those assigned by
the agency; and agency regulations provide a clear benchmark for
assessing attorney conduct."81 This definition offers concrete bound-
aries and is specific enough to help determine duties of confidentiality
and conflicts of interest.
The report notes that others who have considered the question,
including the Federal Bar Association, 2 federal lawmakers,83 disci-
plinary bodies," and commentators, 5 have also concluded that the
78. See Report by the District of Columbia Bar Special Comm. on Government Lawyers
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, reprinted In WASH. LAW, Sept.-Oct. at 53
(1988).
79. Id at 7.
80. Id. at 9 (quoting Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC.
Ass'N BAR CrrY N.Y. 649, 654 (1977)).
81. Id at 13-14.
82. See FBA MODEL RULES, supra note 47, at Rule 1.13 (stating that "[e]xcept when
representing another client ... a Government lawyer represents the Federal Agency that
employs the Government lawyer .... Unless otherwise specifically provided, the Federal
Agency, not the organizational element, is ordinarily considered the client").
83. Post-employment conflict of interest rules prohibit senior federal officials from doing
business with their former agencies after they leave government service. See 18 U.S.C. §
207(c) (1988); 5 C.F.R. §§ 737.11-13 (1989).
84. Committe on Professional Ethics, New York State Bar Association, Opinion 501
(1979). "When a governmental body is organized into a number of separate departments or
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government attorney's client should be defined as her employing
agency.
Defining the government lawyer's client as her employing agency
for the purpose of determining conflicts of interest would provide a
clear boundary that would help lawyers to avoid any actual or appar-
ent conflicts of interest, but it would not prohibit a wide range of
other conduct that might be desirable for other reasons and which
would pose no such conflict. FBA Model Rule 1.7 encourages deter-
mination of the presence or absence of conflicts by examination of
each situation:
(a) A Federal lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa-
tion of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The Federal lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client;
and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A Federal lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa-
tion of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's respon-
sibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the Federal
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The Federal lawyer reasonably believes the representation
will not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation ....
The rule imposes a duty on each lawyer to make a case by case
determination of whether the interests of one client are adverse to
another, or whether the representation of one client would be materi-
ally limited by the representation of another. If one treats the entire
United States government as the client, it might be impossible in
many cases to determine the client's "interest."' The interest in
question, and the relevant consent, if appropriate, is that of officials
of the agency being represented.
While the definition of client as agency is preferable to a broad-
agencies, such department or agency, and not the parent governmental unit, should be treated
as the client for purposes of the rule which forbids concurrent representation of one client
against another." Id. at 15.
85. Weinstein & Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attor-
neys and Clients, 1 TOURO L. REv. 1, 3 n.5 (1985).
86. FBA MODEL RULES, supra note 47, at Rule 1.7.
87. There are frequent conflicts between agencies adversarial negotiations and even law-
suits by one agency against another. In such a situation how might a lawyer determine the
interest of the United States?
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er definition, in some instances it is overbroad. If a lawyer works for
a massive department, such as the Departments of Defense or Health
and Human Services, the office in which she works might be as
institutionally separate from another office in the department as a
FERC lawyer would be from the Veteran's Administration. If the
government attorney's client is redefined as her agency, the question
of whether a whole department or a sub-unit of a department is an
agency will require further examination.
While the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct define the client
of each government.attomey as her agency, the rules defer to defini-
tions supplied by other law. While state ethics codes generally apply
to lawyers in private practice and to government lawyers equally,88
the D.C. rule does not purport to displace 18 U.S.C. section 205. The
prohibitions of section 205 will remain intact until Congress notices
that this statute embodies a nineteenth century notion of conflicts of
interest, and amends it to make it consistent with other contemporary
analysis.
B. Conflicts of Interest of State and Local Government Lawyers
The case law addressing who is the client of the government
attorney for the purpose of determining conflicts of interest involves
mainly part-time state or local government lawyers, and most of the
cases involve conflicts with compensated private practice. Neverthe-
less, a review of these cases offers some useful insights. The courts
tend to examine each situation to determine whether the government
lawyer in question has an actual or an apparent conflict of interest. In
doing so, they almost always define the "client" of the government
lawyer more narrowly than does 18 U.S.C section 205.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia held that lawyers in the
same firm as a part-time county prosecutor should accept court ap-
pointments to represent indigent criminal defendants, and that they
should not be paid for such representation.89 The court decided that
the right to representation was so fundamental as to override the
possible appearance of impropriety. The court, however, ordered that
such appointments should be accepted only from other counties than
the ones in which the prosecutor-partner serves, and then only with
the knowing written consent of the defendant.'
88. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
89. State es reL Sowa v. Sommerville, 280 S.E.2d 85, 87 (W. Va. 1981).
90. Id at 87.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that one attorney or one
law firm could not properly represent both a municipality and the
county within which the municipality was located, because of likely
conflicts arising from the numerous business transactions between the
two entities.91 The same court in another case confronted the ques-
tion of whether a municipal prosecutor may represent the municipality
against its employees in disciplinary or other proceedings. 92 The
court held that if the lawyer and the employee had regular and fre-
quent contact (such as that between prosecutors and police officers)
there might be at least the appearance of a conflict of interest and the
lawyer should not prosecute the employee.9 3 The court noted that an
appearance of impropriety must be "more than a fanciful possibility"
to disqualify the lawyer.'
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held
that a trial judge acted improperly by barring a part-time county
attorney who was assigned exclusively to the Department of Social
Services from representing a criminal defendant.95 The court found
that there was neither a conflict of interest nor an appearance of
impropriety because the lawyer's institutional affiliation, while formal-
ly with the County Attorney, which was prosecuting the case, was
actually with the Department of Social Services. 6
The functionalist analysis used in these decisions offers a striking
contrast to the formalistic approach of federal law. Rather than a
categorical preclusion of a broad range of activity, such as is imposed
by 18 U.S.C. section 205, the courts look at each case to determine
whether the lawyer's representation of a client involves advocacy of
interests that are contrary to the lawyer's official duties. If not, the
representation is permitted, even if the lawyer is engaging in advoca-
cy "against the government".
One might ask why the state policies are so much more permis-
sive, and whether there is some justification for the federal govern-
ment to have more restrictive policies on conflicts of interest or on
pro bono work than those articulated by the courts with respect to
91. In re Opinion No. 415, NJ. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 81
NJ. 318, 407 A.2d 1197, 1198 (1979).
92. Perillo v. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 83 NJ. 366, 416 A.2d 801
(1980).
93. Id. at 376, 416 A.2d at 807.
94. Id
95. Moxham v. Hannigan, 89 A.D.2d 300, 455 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (1982).
96. Id at 304-05, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
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state or local attorneys. One reason for the difference is historical;
federal policy was set by statute at a time when the government and
the practice of law were very different from the contemporary picture.
State rules were written more recently than the nineteenth centu-
ry federal statutes. But this is not a complete answer since federal
policy was reviewed and reaffirmed during the Reagan administration.
Perhaps the recent policy was based on an explicit wish to prevent
poor people from getting legal assistance, and indeed to reduce pay-
ment of public benefits.' Many states have more positive policies
on services to poor people. If there is any justification for a differ-
ence between state and federal policy, it would be in support of a
more restrictive policy for state and local government lawyers. The
state and local governments are smaller and more interconnected, and
more likely to present conflicts or appearance problems than is the
vast federal government.
The cases on government lawyers' conflicts of interest demon-
strate the relatively few circumstances in which conflicts arise, and
offer models for weighing possible conflicts or appearance problems
against public policy objectives that favor allowing government law-
yers to engage in more diverse activities.
C. Conflicts Between Government Work and Pro Bono Projects
The question of who is a government lawyer's client in this
context asks what types of pro bono activity would pose a conflict
with a government lawyer's other responsibilities such that they
should be prohibited? What is needed is a definition of client that
avoids any actual or apparent conflicts but does not prohibit pro bono
work that is not problematic.
97. The Reagan Administration sought to eliminate the Legal Services Corporation,
which provides most available free civil legal services to indigent clients. Although this effort
failed, the corporation's budget was cut by 25 percent from $321 million in 1981. As of
January 1989, the Legal Services Corporation budget was $308.5 million. Lawrence, Md.
Lawyers Debate Proposal to Require Legal Work for Poor, Wash. Post, January 9, 1989, at
1., col. 2 (Business). This effort reflected a policy position that such services are undesirable.
The Office of Personnel Management imposed severe restrictions on pro bono work
during the Reagan Administration. These regulations emphasized the duty of loyalty to the
government and were accompanied by a statement by the Federal Legal Council that asserted,
among other things, that "the private bar is fully capable of providing pro bono representa-
tion in the one area in which government lawyers are barred from providing such servic-
es-against their own client, the federal govememnt.' FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra
note 23, at Ch. 990, Appendix A-2. These were amended in April of 1991. See Infra text
accompanying notes 220-23.
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By looking at some specific examples of possible pro bono pro-
jects, one can evaluate the conflicts that might arise from pro bono
undertakings by government lawyers, and test the proposal that, for
this purpose at least, the client should be regarded as the lawyer's
agency 9
8
1. Attorney for the Social Security Administration represents
claimants for social security disability benefits.
If the Social Security Administration (SSA) made the representa-
tion of claimants an official part of a staff attorney's duties (similar
to representation provided to military personnel in court-martial and
other proceedings by the Judge Advocate General's lawyers), there
would be no conflict of interest. If, on the other hand, an SSA law-
yer undertook representation of a claimant as an individual pro bono
project, this activity would pose a conflict of interest. One would
worry that the SSA lawyer would have access to information that
might be used on behalf of the client that should not be used. One
might worry about the possibility of improper influence. Even if
neither of these problems existed, there would be a problem with the
appearance of improper influence, which might inflate the client's
expectations or harm the reputation of the agency for making fair and
objective determinations. While this type of situation presents an
obvious conflict, this example is similar to the work allowed by an
exception to section 205, under which lawyers may represent fellow
employees in EEO matters before their own agencies.
2. FERC lawyer represents a claimant for veteran's benefits.
In contrast to the situation above, a lawyer who works for the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has no greater access to in-
formation from the Department of Veterans' Affairs than an attorney
in private practice. There is a possibility of improper influence based
on the adjudicator learning that the lawyer is a fellow public servant.
However, this is extremely remote, and no more problematic than the
type of positive relationship that might result if the adjudicator and
the claimant's representative learned that they had gone to the same
law school.
98. Assume for the purpose of discussion that the lawyers in each example work on
these matters outside of work hours, that they use no government resources, and that the
work does not interfere with the performance of their official duties. These issues are dealt
with separately.
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One would want the lawyer to make clear to the client that she
worked for a different agency, and that her service was voluntary
rather than official. To avoid any appearance of official sponsorship
of the activity, one might want the lawyer not to identify her agency
affiliation on papers filed in connection with the proceeding. These
details accomplished, it is difficult to imagine even an appearance of
impropriety in such activity. To the contrary, an employee of one
agency would be undertaking voluntary duties that would assist anoth-
er part of the government in accomplishing its mission.
3. Labor Department lawyer represents a social security claim-
ant in an appeal to federal court.
Is there any greater problem with federal government lawyers
appearing in court on behalf of pro bono clients than with their ap-
pearing in administrative hearings? Court proceedings might be more
time-consuming, or they might receive more public attention. The
time problem might be avoided by the exercise of supervisory discre-
tion over the size of pro bono projects taken on by government attor-
neys.9
The publicity problem is more worrisome. If two federal govern-
ment lawyers argue against one another in court, it is possible that
negative publicity would result, which might include allegations of
wasted tax dollars or lack of coordination within the federal govern-
ment. If the pro bono attorney were in a prominent position, publicity
would be more likely.
This problem can be avoided by the pre-screening process pres-
ently in place in most agencies. If each lawyer wishing to undertake
a pro bono case that might go to court must seek advance approval
from an agency official, the cases can be examined for their potential
to cause embarrassment or to create an appearance problem. The few
cases in which publicity was likely, either because of the nature of
the case or the'identity of the parties or the lawyers involved, permis-
sion to undertake representation might be declined. And in those in
which permission was granted, the lawyer might be required to ex-
plain in writing that she was acting not on behalf of her agency but
99. Federal District Judge Royce Lamberth explained that a judge assigning a pro bono
case can make a reasonable prediction of the time required. Presentation to the Federal Bar
Ass'n, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 1989).
If a court hearing is scheduled at a time that poses a conflict for one of the attor-
neys, a motion for a continuance would normally be granted.
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as a pro bono attorney.
4. Health and Human Services attorney meets with Congressio-
nal staffers on behalf of the Women's Legal Defense Fund in support
of a bill (unrelated to the lawyer's official duties) that would create a
new program within HHS.
This example allows examination of the propriety of pro bono
work involving legislative advocacy by a government attorney. Here,
the lawyer might have no access to agency information if the bill
dealt with a topic different from the topics involved in the lawyer's
work. Nevertheless, one would worry, even if the lawyer were not
officially identified with HHS, that the affiliation would become
known to the staffers and would affect their evaluation of the
lawyer's comments. While there is no particular conflict problem
relating to the legislative nature of the work, the impact of the bill on
the lawyer's own agency creates an appearance of impropriety, be-
cause the lawyer is not acting under the authority of the agency.
5. Agriculture Department attorney attends meetings with Con-
gressional staffers on behalf of the National Rifle Association (of
which the attorney is a member) opposing a gun control bill. The gun
control bill is supported by the administration.
This example presents none of the problems of the preceding
one. As in other examples, one would want to disallow the lawyer
from creating the appearance that his action was on behalf of the
department. This example presents a situation in which the lawyer's
pro bono work is a form of political expression. One could argue that
the "government interest" is the administration position; alternatively
one might urge that the more important government interest is to
allow citizens to participate in a democratic process.
6. Attorney for the Federal Communications Commission drafts
comments on a proposed Housing and Urban Development rule on
behalf of the Community for Creative Non-Violence, and appears at a
hearing to explain the comments.
Here is an example of what might be a typical type of adminis-
trative advocacy undertaken on a pro bono basis by a federal govern-
ment lawyer. One would be uncomfortable with the lawyer participat-
ing in such a proceeding at her own agency on behalf of a private
organization, but in an appearance before another agency, there is no
connection between the lawyer's work and the decision-maker that
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would create even the appearance of impropriety.
These examples show the types of conflict questions that might
be raised by government lawyers doing pro bono work in which the
government had an interest. They suggest that current law sweeps too
broadly in its prohibitions. While there is some possibility that a
narrower conflict rule would result in an occasional appearance prob-
lem, most such problems could be avoided through screening of pro
bono cases.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON PRO BONO WORK IMPOSED
BY 18 U.S.C. SECTION 205
A. The Statute
Some of the significant barriers to performance of pro bono
work are imposed by 18 U.S.C. section 205, which is based on an
1853 statute. Others are imposed by agency regulations. This section
will explore those barriers.
18 U.S.C. section 205 imposes limits on "officers and employ-
ees" "°° of the United States in all three branches of the government
or in any agency of the United States.' The statute prohibits these
persons from acting (other than in performance of their official du-
ties) as an "agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the
United States, or receiv[ing] any gratuity, or any share of or interest
in any such claim" in payment for prosecuting it.' 2 It prohibits act-
100. This language indicates the broad applicability of the statute and the irrelevance of
distinctions drawn in some case law between officers and employees. B. MANNINo, FEDERAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 23-24 (1964). Neither of these terms is defined in the statute.
101. In addressing whether a federal employee could act as agent or attorney for the
employees of the Senate Restaurant in their efforts to organize a bargaining unit, a 1981
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel explains that the "legislative history of the conflict of
interest laws indicates that the representational bar of section 205 was not intended to prohib-
it services before 'congress or its committees' (citing H.R. Rep. No. 748, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess. 20 (1961)), but it does apply to other parts of the legislative branch." The opinion
explains that the term "agency" is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 6 to include "any department,
independent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau of the Unit-
ed States or any corporation in which the United States has a proprietary interest, unless the
context shows that such term was intended to be used in a more limited sense." This creates
"a presumption that a governmental entity is an agency for purposes of a given offense,
including the conflict of interest statutes." Op. Off. Legal Counsel 194-97 (1988).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 205. The courts have interpreted the phrase "claims against the United
States" to include only claims for money. See, e.g., Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567 (1886)
(stating that a claim against the United States is a "right to demand money" in a related
statute); United States v. Bergson, 119 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1954) (interpreting the term
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ing as "agent or attorney 0 3 for anyone before any department,
agency, court, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military or naval
commission, in connection with any covered matter' °4 in which the
United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest." 5
A parallel provision prohibits an "officer- or employee of the
District of Columbia or an officer or employee of the Office of the
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia" from acting
(other than in the performance of official duties) as an agent or attor-
ney against the District of Columbia."
"claims against the United States' as used in 18 U.S.C § 284 as demands for money and
property). This interpretation would mean that defense of a person against a claim by the
United States would not be prohibited by the statute. B. MAWNG, supra note 100, at 87
(citing United States v. 679.19 Acres of Land, 113 F. Supp. 590 (D.N.D. 1953)).
A committee of the New York City Bar, which exhaustively studied this statute, urged
that the prohibition of representation of others in claims against the United States would
prohibit representation of an individual seeking a tax refund but would not prohibit defense
of a client claiming not to owe a tax assessed against him. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FEDER-
AL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, CON-
FLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 61 (1960) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
103. The prohibition on acting as agent or attorney has been interpreted to prohibit repre-
sentational activities such as appearing at a proceeding or signing documents filed with an
adjudicator, but not to prohibit other behind-the-scenes assistance. In Refine Construction Co.
v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 56 (1987), a Veterans Administration employee was found to
have violated section 205 by preparing material and cost estimates for a company submitting
a bid for a contract, and by defending those estimates "before a government auditor within
the context of the negotiation of a contract between the government and his principal." IM at
61. At an earlier negotiating session, the court noted that "Mr. Scott did not speak for his
client ...but rather, limited his role to that of a consultant to plaintiff," and concluded that
"[t]his action did not constitute a violation of section 205." Id. See Bachman v. Pertschuk,
437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977) (distinguishing appearance in court from preparation of the
case of a criminal defendant, urging that the former but not the latter was prohibited by
section 205); 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 194, 196 (1981) (noting that a federal government
attorney was prohibited from acting as "agent or attorney" for a group of employees seeking
to organize a union, but stating "[w]e stress that section 205 does not bar Mr. A from aiding
and assisting the Senate employees in their efforts to organize, as long as he does not act as
their 'agent or attorney."') See infra notes 144-77 and accompanying text (discussing the
1962 amendments of section 205, which added language prohibiting acting as agent or attor-
ney but did not include in that section language prohibiting assistance short of representation).
104. A covered matter is a judicial or other "proceeding, application, request for a ruling
or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest or other particu-
lar matter". 18 U.S.C. § 205 (h) (Supp. 1990).
105. Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12146, 1-301, 3 C.F.R. 409, 410 (1980), 15 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1264, 1265 (July 18, 1979), the Attorney General was mandated to estab-
lish a "litigation notice system that provides timely information about all civil litigation pend-
ing in the courts in which the Federal Government is a party or has a significant interest.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 205(b) (Supp. 1991). The activities prohibited are the same with respect
to D.C. employees in relation to the D.C. government as are the activities prohibited to fed-
eral employees in relation to the federal government. Employees of the United States
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Subsection (c) of section 205 provides that subsections (a) and
(b) have only limited impact on "special Government employees."'"
This class of part-time employees are subject to these prohibitions
only for matters in which they have participated personally and sub-
stantially and had some decisional responsibility, and for matters
pending before the department or agency of government in which the
employee works.1°8
The statute creates two significant exceptions to the prohibited
activities. One is that government employees are permitted to repre-
sent persons subject to "disciplinary, loyalty or other personnel ad-
ministration proceedings" brought by the govemment.' °9 This excep-
tion is essentially a pre-approved category of permitted pro bono
work The statute provides governmental consent to pro bono repre-
sentation of employees in matters that present an actual conflict of
interest." ° The policy expressed is that employees with grievances
Attorney's office in D.C. are covered under both these provisions. Memorandum from Donald
E. Campbell, Acting Director of the United States Office of Government Ethics (Dec. 18,
1989) (setting forth a General Summary of the Government Ethics Reform Act of 1989,
Public Law 101-194 (November 30, 1989)).
107. According to 18 U.S.C. section 202(a) (Supp. 1991), a special Government employee
is "an officer or employee of the executive or legislative branch of the United Stated Gov-
eminent, of any independent agency of the United States or of the District of Columbia,"
who is employed with or without pay for not more than 130 days during any 365-day peri-
od. The employment contemplated includes "temporary duties either on a full-time or intermit-
tent basis" and includes part-time United States commissioners and part-time United States
magistrates. Independent counsels are classified as special employees regardless of the number
of days of employment, as are part-time local representatives of Members of Congress who
work in local districts, and some Reserve officers.
The language of the statute would suggest that a law student working part-time in the
government might qualify as a special employee and therefore not be precluded from repre-
sentation of indigent criminal defendants through a law school clinic. But the director of the
Office of Government Ethics, in a recent letter to the clinical dean at Georgetown Law
School, explains that the status of a student is not merely a function of how many days or
portions of a day he or she may work for the Federal Government: "[A] special Government
employee must be designated as such when he or she is appointed. If he or she is not so
designated, then he or she is a regular employee regardless of the number of days he or she
works." Letter to Wallace J. Mlyniec from Donald E. Campbell, Acting Director of the
Office of Government Ethics (April 3, 1990) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
108. The second of these prohibitions applies only to those whose service has exceeded
sixty out of the last 365 days. 18 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. 1991).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 205(d) (Supp. 1991).
110. In such cases, one lawyer within an agency is representing an individual against the
employer agency. Even if the government attorney's client were defined as the agency rather
than the United States, this would present a conflict of interest. Since this provision has been
in effect since 1963, it would be interesting to do a case study on its operation, to determine
what if any problems have arisen as a result of allowing pro bono work against the agency.
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against their agencies should have representation in those claims with-
out having to hire a private attorney. Some agencies allow use of
administrative leave for this purpose."' In addition, employees are
permitted to represent certain relatives' against the United States
(or D.C., in the case of D.C. employees) in matters in which the
employee has not had personal or substantial involvement or official
responsibility.
113
Violation of section 205 is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
of up to $100,000 or up to a year in prison, or both, or, if willful,
violation is a felony punishable by a fine of up to $250,000, or up to
five years in prison, or both. The law also authorizes a civil action
against a violator by the Department of Justice, which could result in
a fine of not more than $50,000, or the amount of compensation
received or offered for the prohibited conduct, whichever is greater.
In addition, the Justice Department may request an injunction prohib-
iting a person from engaging in conduct that would violate the stat-
ute.1
14
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. section 205 is interesting for
a couple of reasons. Most importantly, it shows that, until the Reagan
administration, no deliberate decision was ever made in Congress or
in the executive branch to prohibit pro bono work. Second, the early
history vividly depicts the same types of use of government position
for private gain that has plagued our federal government in recent
years. The original version of 18 U.S.C. section 205 was part of a
statute entitled "An Act to Prevent Frauds upon the Treasury of the
United States," enacted in 1853.115 The statute was enacted during a
11. Interview with Joyce Allen (federal government attorney interviewed by the author,
identified by fictitious name); see infra text accompanying notes 279-81.
112. The employee may represent parents, tpouses, children, and anyone for whom the
employee serves as a personal fiduciary. 18 U.S.C. § 205(e) (Supp. 1991).
113. There are two other exceptions: One allows performance of work under grants by,
or contracts with, or for the benefit of, the United States, with the permission of the head of
the relevant department or agency. 18 U.S.C. § 205(f) (Supp. 1991). The other allows gov-
ernment employees to give testimony that they are required by law to give. Id at § 205(g).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 216 (added by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989); Summary of Act, 135
CONG. REc. H9719 (daily ed. December 11, 1989) (statement of Rep. Fuzio).
115. 10 Stat. 170 (1853). Section 2 of the statute provided the following:
And be it further enacted, That any officer of the United States, or person holding
any place of trust or profit, or discharging any official function under, or in con-
nection with, any executive department of the Government of the United States, or
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period in which government officials were routinely paid by others to
pursue claims against the government or to advocate for their inter-
ests. 6  Such activities were not, until the 1853 law was passed,
prohibited or regarded as improper. One striking example appears in a
letter from Senator Daniel Webster to Nicholas Biddle, President of
the National Bank, suggesting that Webster should raise the issue in
Congress that President Jackson had proposed to withdraw U.S. funds
from the bank:
Since I have arrived here, I have had an application to be
concerned, professionally, against the Bank, which I have declined,
of course, although I believe my retainer has not been renewed, or
refreshed as usual. If it be wished that my relation to the Bank
should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual retain-
ers.
117
Apparently this type of activity was common. Congressmen, senators
and executive branch officials filed claims for individuals, appeared in
the Supreme Court and other courts, and engaged in other advocacy
under the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, who, after the
passage of this act, shall act as an agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim
against the United States, or shall in any manner, or by any means, otherwise than
in the discharge of his proper official duties, aid or assist in the prosecution or
support of any such claim or claims, or shall receive any gratuity, or any share of
or interest in any claim from any claimant against the United States, with intent to
aid or assist, or in consideration of having aided or assisted, in the prosecution of
such claim, shall be liable to indictment, as for a misdemeanor, in any court of
the United States having jurisdiction thereof, and, on conviction, shall pay a fine
not exceeding five thousand dollars, or suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary not
exceeding one year, or both, as the court in its discretion shall adjudge.
Note that this language makes representation or receipt of compensation a crime. This
language prohibited even uncompensated representation. Section 3 of the statute imposed
similar prohibitions on members of Congress, but only prohibited such activity if it was
compensated.
Section 8 of the statute provided: "And be it further enacted, That nothing in the
second and third sections of this act contained shall be construed to apply to the prosecution
or defence of any action or suit in any judicial court of the United States."
116. With respect to this and the other nineteenth century conflict of interest provisions,
one commentator has stated that the statutes "were born alike out of a primitive personnel
system, a poorly controlled disbursement procedure, and the wastes of war." Ass'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST
LAWS, CONFLICT OF DERE AND FEDERAL SERVICE 44 (1960) (on file at Hofstra Law
Review) [hereinafter NEW YORK CITY BAR REPORT].
117. Id. at 30 (quoting from Letters From Daniel Webster to Nicholas Biddle, October
29, 1833, December 21, 1833, in MCGRANE, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF NICHOLAS BIDDLE
216-17, 218 (1919)).
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activities for compensation."1 ' During the Civil War some members
of Congress published advertisements offering their services in the
Washington newspapers. 9 Some government employees reviewed
government files to identify claimants to whom they might offer their
services or whose claims they might purchase. 2
The most notorious claim scandal of the period, the Gardiner
incident, involved Senator Corwin of Ohio, who became Secretary of
the Treasury during the incident. Corwin represented a dentist who
was attempting to collect $500,000 from the Mexican Claims Com-
mission for a silver mine that the dentist claimed he had owned, and
which had been destroyed during the Mexican War. Corwin was to
be paid five percent of the proceeds for his services. In addition,
Corwin purchased a one-fourth interest in the claim. When Senator
Corwin became Secretary of the Treasury, he sold his interest in the
claim. The claim turned out to be entirely fraudulent, but Corwin may
not have known of the fraud.' 1 One Congressman, in a speech de-
fending Corwin's reputation, urged that representation of others before
the government by members of Congress was commonplace:
Every gentleman who hears me knows that it is usual, and has been
from the beginning of this Government, for Senators and members
of this House to appear as counsel for fee and reward or compensa-
tion before the Supreme Court of the United States, to appear be-
fore any of the courts of the Union, and before commissioners
appointed to adjudicate claims similar to these."
In the discussion that followed this comment, several members of.
Congress acknowledged having represented 'others in claims against
the United States but denied having been paid for doing so."23
The original version of 18 U.S.C. section 205 was introduced by
the committee appointed to investigate the Corwin matter, and was
presented as a response that would prevent such conduct in the fu-
ture. 24 The bill sought to prohibit government officials from getting
118. I,
119. IM at 32 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 559
(1864) (statement of Rep. Hale)).
120. I,
121. Id at 32-33.
122. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong. 2d Sess. 289 (1853) (statement of Rep. Stephens). The
Congressman then went on to list several other members of Congress who, he urged, had
engaged in similar activities.
123. Id
124. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1853).
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paid for handling claims against the United States. Senator Badger of
North Carolina, chief proponent of the bill, explained the purpose of
the new law:
It was intended for the benefit of a class of men who are entitled to
the aid and assistance of the Government-for the benefit of the
poor and ignorant, who have claims against the United States, and
who are put under the necessity, as the law now exists, of submit-
ting to the most grinding oppression... for the purpose of getting
their claims brought forward and sanctioned here in Congress, or
before the Executive Departments.
It was intended, in the second place, to protect the United
States, because, as the law stands at present, the largest inducements
are held out to crafty or dishonest men to get up, by whatever
means, maintain, and carry through before the Departments, or be-
fore Congress, claims that are really unfounded, or claims that are
greatly exaggerated.
The next object was to protect the Government, by preventing
the Executive officers of the Government from employing them-
selves, while they hold office under the Government of the United
States, and are paid by the Government of the United States, from
availing themselves of their opportunities to hunt up and to prose-
cute claims against the Government. It is needless for me to say to
what crying abuses such a privilege has already led, and must con-
tinue to lead, unless it is put an end to.125
Representative Andrew Johnson of Tennessee spoke in support of
the 1853 bill:
I cannot conclude without making an earnest appeal to the House to
come forward and sustain this bill, as one step towards arresting
and condemning this system of high-handed plundering and swin-
dling, which has been and is being carried on, about Congress and
the various departments of Government. Sound morality, common
honesty, justice, an eviscerated Treasury, all demand that something
should be done to separate these vampires from the body politic.
There must be something done to restore public confidence, for it is
going very fast, if not already gone. The Government and the func-
tionaries of Government are beginning to stink in the very nostrils
of the nation; it is now dead and rotten in many of its parts, while
the disease is rapidly making its way into the others less accessible.
Its putrid stench is sent forth upon every wind and is arresting the
attention of the voracious vultures throughout the land, and they
125. CoNG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 1339 (1852).
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have gathered, and are still gathering, around the carcass, ready to
begin their foul work 26
The discussion of the bill reveals that its primary purpose was to
prevent government officials from economically exploiting their public
positions. The discussion shows that some members of Congress
wished to continue to permit uncompensated assistance. In 1851 an
early version of the bill was introduced by Congressman Smart pro-
hibiting the prosecution of claims against the United States by heads
of Departments, Senators and Representatives in Congress. In com-
menting on the bill, Congressman Jones objected to the indiscriminate
prohibition of this type of service whether compensated or not:
We are all in the habit here, or at least I am, of attending to every
claim which our constituents may send us against the Government
in any of the Departments or before Congress. I have never re-
ceived, directly or indirectly, the first cent of compensation for such
services .... [A] bill should be so guarded as not to prevent oth-
ers from attending to the legitimate demands of their constituents
against the Government. 7
Senator Underwood made a similar objection to the prohibition of
uncompensated representation of others against the government, urging
that in the absence of compensation there was no evil in the service:
There is another provision of this bill, which I think should not be
sanctioned. It is this: it punishes officers of the Government con-
nected with Departments, who may aid or assist in the prosecution
of claims, although they receive no reward for so doing. In the
other provisions of the bill, the punishments are connected with the
reception of rewards on the part of the individual who prosecutes
improperly. But in regard to officers of the Government... if he
assists an old father or mother, or brother, or sister, or friend, in the
prosecution of a claim against the Government, though he does not
receive a cent, or any benefit whatever, he is liable to be indicted,
and punished by imprisonment for six months, and a fine of $1,000,
under the operation of this bill, as I understand it. Now that seems
to me to be a degree of rigor, for the exercise of mere benevolence
towards a friend or relation, which is excessively severe. There is
no evil, it seems to me, likely to grow out of gratuitous service
rendered for a relative or a friend. There is no motive to induce an
officer to suborn witnesses when he has no interest at stake, or to
126. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (Appendix 1853).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 1338 (1851).
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act corruptly in any manner whatever.12 8
In the 1853 debate it was clear that the section of the original
bill that applied to members of Congress prohibited compensated
prosecution of claims, but not uncompensated representation, the latter
being regarded, at least by some, as appropriate constituent service.
But section 2, which applies to executive branch employees, prohibit-
ed both compensated and uncompensated representation. 2 9 It is not
possible to determine whether Senator Underwood's colleagues heard
and rejected his comments, or whether his analysis was lost in the
legislative shuffle.
The statute was not originally intended to prohibit pro bono
publico representation; at the time that the 1853 law was passed,
there was no clear conception of "pro bono work."'t3 Those who
debated the bill appeared to contemplate that one might do some
uncompensated service for a constituent, a friend or a relative, but not
for a needy stranger.
The legislation was focused only on "claims against the United
States," which referred to claims for payment from the United States
Treasury.13' It did not cover other adversarial proceedings against
the government, and section 8 specifically excluded from its prohibi-
tions "the prosecution or defence of any action or suit in any judicial
court of the United States." 132 This section of the statute was re-
pealed as part of some technical amendments adopted in 1873, even
though the revision committee had no authority to make substantive
changes in the law.133 But for this deletion, a large proportion of
needed pro bono assistance would not now be prohibited by section 205.
In 1864 another similar statute was enacted to prohibit represen-
tation of others against the United States."3 It prohibited representa-
128. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 1338 (1852).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 295 (1853) (discussion among Reps. Stevens,
King and Howard).
130. The first institutional recognition of the need for free legal services in the United
States occurred in the 1880's when the first legal aid offices were established by charities
and bar associations. Their purpose was to protect recent immigrants from economic exploita-
tion. By 1917, legal aid offices had been established in forty-one cities. Cardin & Rhudy,
supra note 7, at 3 (citing E. BROWNEI.L, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 170-72 (1951
& Supp. 1961) and R. SMITH, JusncE AND THE POOR 147-48 (3d ed. 1924)).
131. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 STAT. 170.
132. Id. at 171.
133. See B. MAN4NING, supra note 100, at 278 (Appendix E, Abstracts of Legislative
History) (citing REv. STAT. § 5596 (1873) and 2 CONG. REC. 129 (1873)). Manning indicates
that the legislative history offers no comment on the reason for this change.
134. 13 Stat. 123 (1864). This law, entitled "An Act relating to Members of Congress,
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tion of others in any matter in which the United States was a party
or had an interest. It covered members of Congress as well as mem-
bers of the executive branch. It prohibited only compensated activity,
and was limited to matters before an executive department. The law
did not apply to court actions.135 Since there is a great deal of
overlap in the objectives, the coverage, and, indeed, in the language
of these two statutes, it is not clear why, in 1864, Congress enacted a
new law instead of amending the old one. The New York City Bar
report suggests that "abuses had continued and grown worse with the
war, scandal was in the air, public opinion was aroused, and action
was the order of the day."'3 6 But the debate on the 1864 bill, while
it includes a couple of mentions of the 1853 bill,'37 largely ignores
Heads of Departments, and other Officers of the Government", required:
That no member of the Senate or House of Representatives shall, ... nor shall
any head of a department, head of a bureau, clerk, or any other officer of the
government receive or agree to receive any compensation whatsoever, directly or
indirectly, for any services rendered, or to be rendered, after the passage of this
act, to any person, either by himself or another, in relation to any proceeding,
contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other matter or thing in
which the United States is a party, or directly or indirectly interested, before any
department, court-martial, bureau, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commis-
sion whatever. And any person offending against any provision of this act shall, on
conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished by a fine
not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years, at the discretion of the court trying the same, and shall be forever
thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the gov-
ernment of the United States.
Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 119, 13 Stat. 123.
135. NEW YORK CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 116, at 39.
136. Id. at 40. In 1873, Congress repealed the section of the 1953 act that applied to
members of Congress, apparently thinking that the 1864 act had intended to repeal this sec-
tion. Id.
137. Senator Johnson said in reference to the bill, "[t]he most of its provisions, so far as
I understand them from the reading, appear to be reenacting the laws as they are. An act
passed several years ago prohibits any member of Congress from prosecuting any claim
against the Government except in the courts. This bill, I think, repeats that provision." CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 555 (1864).
Later, in the rather lengthy debate, Senator Cowan pointed out the existence of the
1853 law again. He assumed that the purpose of the new law was to increase the penalties
imposed for conduct already prohibited (the 1853 law allowed a one-year jail sentence, and
the 1864 law allowed a two-year jail sentence), and he objected to that increase. He said:
I believe it is proper in making a new law to inquire first what the old law is;
second, the mischiefs; and then to look at the remedy. Now, as I understand the
mischief which is to be corrected here, it is that members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives are in the habit of appearing in cases where the
United States are concerned. I suppose there can be no mischief in their appearing
on behalf of the United States. I suppose there is nobody who complains of that
here. If there be any mischief at all it must exist in their appearing before certain
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the existence of the previous law. It seems that many Senators enact-
ed the 1864 law without having read the 1853 law, and that they
simply did not understand their relationship to one another.
The debate on the 1864 bill focused on the restrictions that the
bill would impose on members of Congress, specifically on the limi-
tation on their ability to practice law. The Senate discussion makes it
abundantly clear that the bill was not intended to prohibit uncompen-
sated activity. 3 ' There was lengthy debate about whether to prohibit
members of Congress from representing defendants before courts-
martial. Senator Johnson indicated that most such defendants had no
money, and that he represented them without fee. 3 9 But Senator
Fessenden pointed out that very few of the other lawyers in Congress
represented clients without fee:
There are not many of our profession who are situated precisely as
is my honorable friend from Maryland. We are generally men who
work for pay in our profession. We like fees. We are not disposed
to give our time and our labor and our study, as the gentleman
from Maryland is, for weeks to the defense of people whom we do
not know, merely from love of the profession or a sense of profes-
sional duty; and therefore the bill as it stands will apply to every-
body but him.4'
The 1864 law, like the one enacted in 1853, prohibited representation
by certain government officials before executive departments, but it
did not prohibit any court representation except of defendants before
courts-martial.
141
tribunals, not the judicial tribunals of the country, against the United States. If that
is the mischief, then I propose to read the law as it stands already. I read from
the act of the 26th of February, 1853:
Id at 561. He then went on to object to the increased penalties. His speech was followed by
a comment from Senator Trumbull that "the debate which has ensued on this bill is an
illustration of the truth that we know not what is before us." Id
138. In fact, the original draft included language that would have prohibited uncompensat-
ed representation; this was deleted by amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Ses. 555
(1864).
139. Id at 556.
140. Id at 558.
141. Senator Trumbull, who presented the Judiciary Committee bill to the Senate, said
that "[t]he bill as reported by the committee does not prohibit members of Congress from
practicing in the courts of the county; but it does prohibit them from appearing before
courts-martial, commissions, Departments, bureaus, or anywhere else for a fee or consideration
from anyone." Id at 555.
The prohibition on appearing in a court-martial was based, at least in part, on the
possibility of improper influence, since the Senate acted on promotion of officers, including
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These two statutes, both predecessors of 18 USC section 205,
changed little during the century following their enactment.1 42 In the
late 1950s attention turned again to this statute, primarily because its
prohibitions prevented the government from engaging the services of
many desirable attorney consultants and such services had become
necessary.143 The New York City Bar did a major study of the
problem of conflicts of interest of federal employees and made pro-
posals that became the basis of a set of amendments. In 1962, Con-
gress made some significant changes in the 1853 statute. The product,
Public Law No. 87-849,144 reads as follows:
those who acted as judges in courts-martial. Ia. at 557 (statement of Sen. Foster).
142. The 1958 edition of Section 283 read:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or any department or
agency thereof, or of the Senate or House of Representatives, acts as an agent or
attorney for prosecuting any claim against the United States, or aids or assists in
the prosecution or support of any such claim otherwise than in the proper dis-
charge of his official duties, or receives any gratuity, or share of or interest in any
such claim in consideration of assistance in the prosecution of such claim, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 283 (1958) (repealed 1962). As reported by the New York City Bar, with the
exception of some technical revisions and minor exemptions, section 283 is "substantially
identical to Section 2 of the 1853 statute." NEW YORK CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 116,
at 37. The 1958 version of section 281, also substantially identical to
the original 1864 version, read:
Whoever, being a Member of or Delegate to Congress, or a Resident Commission-
er, either before or after he has qualified, or the head of a department, or other
officer or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof,
directly or indirectly receives or agrees to receive, any compensation for any ser-
vices rendered or to be rendered, either by himself or another, in relation to any
proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other matter
in which the United States is a party or directly or indirectly interested, before any
department, agency, court martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commis-
sion, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit
under the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 281 (1958).
143. In evaluating the operation of the federal conflict of interest statutes, the New York
City Bar Report concludes:
The most damaging result of the present system is its deterrent effect on the re-
cruitment and retention of executive and some kinds of consultative talent. The
restrictions tend to block the interflow of men and information at the very time in
the nation's history when such an interflow is most necessary . . . . [T]he undesir-
able effects of the present system of restraints are traceable to three basic causes:
faulty drafting, inadequate administration, and the obsolescence of the statutes.
NEW YORK CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 116, at 181.
144. The italicized language was added by the 1962 amendments and the bracketed lan-
guage was deleted from the statute.
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Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States [or any
department or agency thereof, or of the Senate or House of Repre-
sentatives,] in the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the
Government or in any agency of the United States, including the
District of Columbia, otherwise than in the proper discharge of his
official duties- 145
(1) acts as [an] agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against
the United States, [or aids or assists in the pr6secution or support of
any such claim otherwise than in the proper discharge of his official
duties,] or receives any gratuity, or any share of or interest in any
such claim in consideration of assistance in the prosecution of such
claim, or
(2) acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department,
agency, court, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military or naval
commission in connection with any proceeding, application, request
for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy,
charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which the
United States is a party or has a direct and substantial interest-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
[one year] two years, or both.'46
The 1962 statute then goes on to provide that this section has
only limited application to special (temporary or intermittent) govern-
ment employees, 47 to exempt (1) representation of others in "disci-
plinary, loyalty, or other personnel administration proceedings", (2)
representation of family members and others for whom the employee
acts as a personal fiduciary, (3) certain grant or contract work, and
(4) the giving of testimony under oath.
Part of the impact of these changes is to expand enormously the
scope of activity prohibited by section 205, and to expand the catego-
ries of federal employees who are covered. These changes incorporate
language from section 203 (the contemporary version of the 1864
statute) into section 205,148 but change its effect. The 1962 statute
is no longer restricted to claims against the United States, but covers
145. The language describing the branches of government is a revision and expansion of
language previously in section 283 (which was the successor of the 1864 law). The language
exempting activities "in the proper discharge of his official duties" appears to have been
moved up to make it apply to the new subsection 2.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
147. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
148. The language describing the covered proceedings and characterizing the conflict as
with proceedings in which "the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial inter-
est" was adapted from the previous language of section 281, which was the 1864 law.
[VCol. 19:1141
PUBLIC SERVICE BY PUBLIC SERVANTS
all sorts of adjudicative proceedings before executive agencies and
before courts.
Section 203 prohibited representation of others by federal em-
ployees in proceedings before executive agencies, but not before
courts. In the language added to section 205 in the 1962 amendments,
the word "courts" was added to the list of prohibited proceedings,
thereby barring representation of parties against the United States
before the judicial as well as the executive branch.
Under section 203, representation of parties in proceedings in
which the United States had an interest had been prohibited only if
compensated. Until 1962, there was no prohibition on pro bono publi-
co representation by federal attorneys against the United States unless
the matter was a "claim against the United States." But the incorpora-
tion into section 205 of the language from section 203 (subsection (2)
above) removes the exemption of uncompensated activity. One ques-
tion, then, is whether this was a purposeful change.
In 1960, there appears to have been only the dimmest awareness
of the possibility that federal government lawyers might wish to do
pro bono work. Indeed, the passing reference to this issue that was
made while the bill was being amended suggests that pro bono work
as we know it did not exist in 1960, or at least was unknown to
those who rewrote section 205. The authors of the New York City
Bar Report thought that their proposed amendments to section 205
should not and would not preclude public service activity:
An employee who is a member of an organization to protect wild-
life, for example, will not run afoul of section 4, [the proposed
language, similar in effect to the final language of section 205, that
would have restricted uncompensated activity] even if he actively
helps the organization in its efforts to influence federal policy in the
direction of better wildlife protection. The efforts of such an organi-
zation would seldom produce "transactions involving the govern-
ment," as defined. In those cases in which it did, the employee
would not encounter a bar under the section unless his government
job involves the same transactions, or he is paid by the organization
to assist it in the transactions, or he acts in the capacity of agent or
attorney in the transactions. 49
The authors of the report, then, did not intend to prohibit pro bono
activity, but they did not conceive that such activity would be repre-
149. NEW YORK CITY BAR REPORT, supra note 116, at 209.
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sentational in nature.
During the hearings on the 1962 bill held by the House of Rep-
resentatives, George Abbott, the Secretary of the Interior, pointed out
that the expansion of section 205 to cover matters other than claims
would result in the prohibition of much public service activity, and
urged that this was undesirable:
The prohibition in proposed section 205 respecting matters other
than claims appears to us to have too broad a reach and would
make activities in which there was no real conflict of interest a
criminal offense. If, and this is certainly a homely example, if an
employee of the Post Office Department is an ardent conservationist
and a member of the Izaak Walton League, we would see no im-
propriety in his assisting gratis in the presentation of the league's
views on a matter under the jurisdiction of the Fish and Wildlife
Service. 50
These comments, the absence of others in the 1962 discussion, and
the absence of any comments to the contrary, indicate that the expan-
sion of section 205 in 1962 beyond coverage of claims against the
United States may have been not a purposeful prohibition of pro
bono activity in which the government was a party, but suggest that
it was an accident of statutory drafting. If pro bono service was a
very marginal activity in the early sixties, these comments might not
have led to amendment of the language even if they were noncontro-
versial. Perhaps the issue was simply not important enough.
The statute makes some peculiar distinctions between prohibition
of representation of parties against the United States, and prohibition
of assistance to such parties. The law fails to prohibit some activity
that might involve an actual conflict of interest, as long as the attor-
ney involved avoids actual representation in proceedings.
The prohibition of prosecution of claims against the United
States applies to compensated and uncompensated representation (act-
ing as agent or attorney) and compensated assistance other than rep-
resentation. Uncompensated assistance with a claim against the United
States would not violate the statute. If a social security disability
matter is a "claim," 5 a federal government attorney could offer
150. C. Elefant, When Helping Others is A Crime: Section 205's Restriction on Pro
Bono Representation By Federal Attorneys at 28 (unpublished manuscript) (on file at Hofstra
Law Review). The author of the cited paper is a federal government attorney who would like
to be able to do more pro bono work.
151. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. Since social security claimants de-
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any other type of pro bono assistance than actual appearance on be-
half of a claimant at a hearing or in court. The attorney could assist
the claimant in filling out forms, marshalling evidence and witnesses,
analyzing the application of the regulations to the matter, and prepar-
ing an explanation of the case.
The second clause of section 205 prohibits federal attorneys from
acting as agent or attorney in any matter in which the United States
is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, regardless of wheth-
er this activity is compensated. However, this provision does not
prohibit any assistance falling short of actual representation, 52 even
if the assistance provided is compensated. 53 This suggests that it
would not violate section 205, for example, for a federal government
attorney to be paid $100,000 for assistance other than. representation
to a drug kingpin being prosecuted by the United States Attorney, or
for assistance short of representation to the government of Lithuania
in obtaining diplomatic recognition by the U.S. government."
While the 1962 amendments might have some anomalous results
in unintended areas, the law was sensibly narrowed in its application
to temporary government employees.155 Section 205 provides that
special government employees are subject to the prohibitions of the
section
only in relation to a particular matter involving a specific party or
parties (1) in which he has at any time participated personally and
substantially as a Government employee or as a special Government
employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation,
the rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise, or (2) which is
mand money from the government, their actions appear to be "claims."
152. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (defining agent or attorney and explain-
ing that this language has been narrowly interpreted to prohibit only representational advocacy
and not other assistance).
153. This peculiarity of the statute was noted in B. MANNING, supra note 100, at 91.
The distinction was also pointed out in a Memorandum Opinion for the Acting General
Counse4 Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics, on the Applicability of 18
U.S.C. 205 to Union Organizing Activities of Department of Justice Employee 5 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 194, 196 (1981), which found that "Mr. A" was barred from acting as agent
or attorney for employees of the Senate restaurant, but "205 does not bar Mr. A from aiding
and assisting the Senate employees in their efforts to organize, as long as he does not act as
their 'agent or attorney.'"
154. These types of assistance, however, might be prohibited by ethical rules or other
law.
155. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (stating that a "special government em-
ployee" is defined by 18 U.S.C. section 202 to include one who is employed for not more
than 130 out of any 365 day period).
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pending in the department or agency of the Government in which
he is serving.
156
This amendment represented an attempt to cull from the mass of
activity prohibited by the statute that which might pose an actual
(clause 1) or apparent (clause 2) conflict of interest with the work of
the particular federal employee. This exception was created because
the government needed to hire consultants whose primary employment
(e.g., law practice) involved some work that was adverse to the feder-
al government. Absent actual conflicts between the consulting work
and the primary work, there was no reason not to allow the use of
such consultants.
1 57
There is a clear analogy to the present concern; now it is full-
time government employees who have an interest in pursuing some
activity that is adverse to the federal government that does not con-
flict with their official responsibilities.
The 1853 statute was intended to prohibit federal employees
from improperly using their positions to influence other parts of the
federal government or to enrich themselves by doing so. If anything,
this purpose would be less offended by allowing uncompensated ac-
tivity by full-time employees than by allowing compensated activity
by part-time employees. It is difficult to justify the imposition of a
broader standard for prohibited pro bono work than the one stated for
special employees.
The bar on a substantial portion of pro bono work by federal
government attorneys was imposed in part in 1853 and in part in
1962, but in neither case was there a deliberate policy decision on
this matter. Much of the present law on this subject might be charac-
terized as an accident of history. Some inappropriate restrictions on
pro bono work could be removed by amending the law to apply the
rules created in 1962 for special employees to pro bono work by full-
time employees.
In the District of Columbia, because of its large population of
federal government lawyers, there have been periodic discussions and
initiatives aimed to permit or encourage more pro bono work by
156. 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1988). The statute further provides that clause 2 of the quoted
section does not apply to those who have served no more than sixty days out of the preced-
ig 365 days.
157. See generally Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REv.
1113, 1123-27 (1963) (noting the failure of the pre-1963 statutes to recognize the distinction
between the regular full time government employees and intermittent government employees).
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government lawyers since the early 1980s. In 1984, David Isbell, then
President of the D.C. Bar, wrote to the heads of all federal agencies
suggesting that they adopt more flexible guidelines on pro bono
work.' Very few agencies changed their rules as a result of this
initiative. 5
9
In 1984 and 1986, Congressman Robert Kastenmeier introduced
legislation that would have amended section 205 to reduce its restric-
tions on pro bono work by federal government attorneys."6 These
were the first times that Congress gave any serious attention to the
question of what pro bono work federal government attorneys should
be permitted to do. Hearings were held in 1986 on the subject.16 1
The ABA gave careful consideration to the restrictions on pro bono
work imposed by the statute, and recommended that federal govern-
ment lawyers should be allowed to represent pro bono clients against
the federal government absent some real or apparent conflict of inter-
est with the lawyer's agency work.'62 The D.C. Circuit Judicial
158. This proposal was based on guidelines issued by the Department of Transportation.
See Pickering, Pro Bono Representation by Government Attorneys, Proposed Resolution to
Amend 18 U.S.C. § 205, 8 DIsT. LAw. 25 (May/June 1984).
159. Interview with John Pickering, Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering (October 1989) and
review of Mr. Pickering's copies of agency responses to David Isbell.
160. See H.R. 6267, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 4898, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).
161. Pro Bono Representation by Employees of the Federal Government and the District
of Columbia, Hearing on H.R 4898 Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties and the Administration of Justice, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Pro Bono Rep-
resentation].
162. In August 1984, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution urging the fol-
lowing:
that government employed attorneys should not be prohibited or discouraged from
representing pro bono clients in general or in actions against the government so
long as such representation does not present a conflict of interest, is consistent
with all other applicable rules of professional responsibility and is not undertaken
on government time or at government expense.
The resolution, which went on specifically to encourage amendment of section 205 to imple-
ment this policy, was accompanied by a report from the Federal Bar Association and two
sections of the ABA, which had proposed the resolution. The report offered examples of
prohibited pro bono work which, the report asserted, posed no real or apparent conflict of
interest:
an attorney employed by the Interior Department cannot represent a claimant in a
social security disability proceeding .... Similarly, an attorney employed by the
State Department could not represent a low-income public housing tenant in an
eviction proceeding if title to the property was vested in the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development.
The ABA favored a more significant amendment of section 205 than was accomplished in
1989, one which would have allowed these types of activity. Dougherty, Watkins and
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Conference adopted a similar recommendation in 1985, urging that
section 205 was "unduly broad and restrictive in a number of re-
spects," and that "there are countless matters where either a federally
employed or District of Columbia attorney could represent an indigent
defendant where there is no conceivable conflict of interest with the
interests of the department or agency for which the attorney
works."
163
The 1984 bill would have allowed federal government lawyers to
represent claimants in federal public benefits hearings, to represent
federal employees in personnel matters in federal courts,"64 and to
represent pro bono clients against the District of Columbia.'6 This
bill, according to Congressman Kastenmeier, was intended "to in-
crease pro bono opportunities for federally employed and D.C. Gov-
ernment attorneys," and "would have allowed representation by a
federally employed attorney or other employee when a different agen-
cy of the Federal Government was on the opposing side, 'if not in-
consistent with the faithful performance of his duties."''" This pro-
posal was opposed by the administration, through the Federal Legal
Council and the Office of Government Ethics. 67
In 1986, Congressman Kastenmeier introduced a narrower bill
that would have allowed federal government lawyers to represent pro
bono clients against the District of Columbia (which was at that time
treated as part of the federal government for the purpose of defining
conflicts of interest) and to allow District of Columbia lawyers to
represent pro bono clients against the federal government. 6 Despite
Hultman, Recommendation from the ABA Special Committee on Lawyers' Public Service
Responsibility, Young Lawyers' Division and the Federal Bar Association (August 1984).
163. Joint Report of the Standing Committees on Civil Legal Aid and on Pro Se and
Pro Bono Matters of the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit at 4. This
proposal was adopted by the 1984 D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference in Thomson v. Jones,
102 F.R.D. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see Letter to Lisa Lerman from Robert L. Weinberg of
Williams & Connolly (Apr. 16, 1990).
164. This would have limited the effect of Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973
(D.D.C. 1977), in which the U.S. District Court for D.C. prohibited such representation.
165. H.R. 6267, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). This bill was supported by the Federal Bar
Association, the ABA, and the Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, but was opposed by
the administration. See Pro Bono Representation, supra note 161 (opening remarks of Con-
gressman Robert W. Kastenmeier). See Pickering, supra note 158 (describing the proposed
amendments).
166. 132 CONG. REC. E1863-02 (daily ed. May 22, 1986) (remarks by Hon. Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
167. Id
168. H.R. 4898, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The purpose of this bill was articulated as
"[to extend the permissible pro bono representation by employees of the Federal Government
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substantial support for the 1986 bill, it was not enacted at that time.
In 1989 the substance of the 1986 bill 169 appeared in a set of
amendments to the federal ethics laws.17 This proposal was then
enacted without controversy. These most recent changes are reflected
as follows:
71
(a) Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States in
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government or in
any agency of the United States, [including the District of Colum-
bia,] other[wise] than in the proper discharge of his official duties-
(1) acts as agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the
United States, or receives any gratuity, or any share of or interest in
any such claim, in consideration of assistance in the prosecution of
such claim; or
(2) acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department,
agency, court, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military, or naval
commission in connection with any [proceeding, application, request
for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy,
charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter] covered matter
in which the United States is a party or has a direct and substantial
interest;
shall be [fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than two years, or both.] subject to the penalties set forth in section
216 of this title.
(b) Whoever, being an officer or employee of the District of Colum-
bia or an officer or employee of the Office of the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia, otherwise than in the proper
discharge of official duties-
(1) acts as agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the
District of Columbia, or receives any gratuity, or any share of or
interest in any such claim in consideration of assistance in the
prosecution of such claim; or
(2) acts as agent or attorney for anyone before any department,
and the District of Columbia Government" (statement of James C. McKay, Jr., co-chair, Dis-
trict of Columbia Affairs Section, District of Columbia Bar). Id at 3. The bill specifically
exempted uncompensated representation against the D.C. government by federal employees and
vice-versa. The 1989 amendment is not restricted to uncompensated activity. See infra notes
169-77 and accompanying text.
169. Although the language of the 1986 bill and the 1989 amendments is different, their
intent appears to be the same.
170. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 404, 103 Stat. 1716, 1750
[hereinafter Ethics Reform Act].
171. The language in italics was added by the amendment and the bracketed language
was deleted.
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agency, court, officer, or any commission in connection with any
covered matter in which the District of Columbia is a party or has
a direct and substantial interest;
shall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216 of this ti-
tle.172
The 1989 version of section 205 also creates a separate section
to define what proceedings are "covered matters" for the purpose of
the prohibitions of the statute; these are "any judicial or other pro-
ceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, con-
tract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or
other particular matter." 73 This definition replicates language in the
1962 version except for the marked changes. It was moved to a sepa-
rate section so that it would apply to subsections (a) and (b).
The penalties language was moved to the end of the section and
amended. It was expanded to allow misdemeanor or felony prosecu-
tion, civil penalties, and injunctions against violators. 74
The most important change in the law is that the District of
Columbia and the United States are now to be treated as separate
entities for the purpose of defining precluded activities. 75 This pro-
172. Ethics Reform Act, supra note 170, at 1750.
173. Id. § 205(h).
174. New section 216 reads:
(a) The punishment for an offense under sections 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, and
209 of this title is the following:
(1) Whoever engages in the conduct constituting the offense shall be
imprisoned for not more than one year or fined in the amount set forth in this
title, or both.
(2) Whoever willfully engages in the conduct constituting the offense shall
be imprisoned for not more than five years or fined in the amount set forth
in this title, or both.
(b) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate United States
district court against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense
... and, upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such
person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each viola-
tion or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for the
prohibited conduct, whichever amount is greater ....
(c) ... the Attorney General may petition an appropriate United States district
court for an order prohibiting that person from engaging in such conduct ....
Ethics Reform Act, supra note 170, § 216, 103 Stat. 1753.
175. The Office of Government Ethics explains this change: "The substantive amendments
to section 205 separate the District of Columbia from the United States for purposes of cov-
erage except for the officers and employees of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia who are treated as if they are officers and employees of both." Memorandum from
Donald E. Campbell, Acting Director, Office of Government Ethics, to Designated Agency
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posal was part of the Bush administration's proposals for the Ethics
Reform Act.
17 6
In 1984 and in 1986, the amendment of 18 U.S.C. section 205
was controversial. In 1989, this change was treated as a technical
amendment. No hearings were held; the bill was introduced and en-
acted in the same week. Organizations and individuals which have a
longstanding interest in the ability of government lawyers to do pro
bono work did not know about the amendment until after it had been
signed into law.I7
C. Interpretation of Section 205
Section 205 has been interpreted by numerous court decisions
and advisory opinions. 7 1 Only a few have dealt directly with at-
tempts by federal government attorneys to do pro bono work. In 1974
Ethics Officials and others, titled "General Summary of the Government Ethics Reform Act
of 1989, Public Law 101-194 (Nov. 30, 1989).
176. Conversation with Jane Lay, Deputy General Counsel, Office of Government Ethics
(Feb. 1990). OGE's 1989 report to the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Re-
form urged that section 205 "be amended to treat the District of Columbia and the federal
governments as separate entities for purposes of applying this provision.- Letter from OGE to
Honorable Malcolm Wilkey, Chairman, President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Re-
form, (Feb. 10, 1989) at 5. In a section of the letter describing the effect of the change for
sections 203 and 205 (in language not precisely correct for 205), OGE explained that "federal
employees would be prohibited from receiving compensation for a representation or represent-
ing another only before the federal government and not the D.C. government and D.C. em-
ployees prohibited from the same conduct only with regard to representations to the District
Government. The one possible exception to this separation would be the Office of the United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia which has a unique role.- Id. at 4.
The language in the statute was not that proposed by the President, but was drafted
by staff of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Telephone interviews with Jane Ley,
Office of Government Ethics, and Linda Gustitis, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
(Feb. 1989).
177. This was true of the Washington Council of Lawyers and the D.C. Circuit Judicial
Conference.
178. Most of the early opinions interpreting section 205 are not directly relevant to this
analysis of the impact of 205 on the ability of government attorneys to do pro bono work.
Most of them examine whether a particular employee is governed by the restrictions of sec-
tion 205. See, e.g., Case v. Helwig, 65 F.2d 186-88 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (lawyer who became
employed by the government during the prosecution of a claim against the United States is
not permitted to retain an interest in the claim); Flower v. United States, 31 Ct. Cl. 35
(1895) (distinguishing officers of the Army who are retired from active service from those
who are wholly retired, who are not officers of the United States, and who are not subject to
section 5498 [the predecessor of 205]); Prosecution of Claims; Temporary Employee, Member
of Law Partnership, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 289 (1943) (prosecution of a claim by the law part-
ner of a consultant to the government would subject the consultant to criminal penalties).
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two evening division students at Georgetown University Law Center
were denied permission to appear in court on a criminal appeal that
they were handling through a law school clinic, because both were
federal employees, and the "clear wording" of 18 U.S.C. section 205
was found "unmistakably" to bar their appearance in court." 9 The
court rejected the students' arguments that the statute had been de-
signed "to deal with corruption and abuses of inside information", and
that there was no actual conflict of interest. 180 The court noted that
the students had "already participated in investigation and drafting of
legal memoranda in [the] case;" 1  since the judge did not indicate
that these actions violate the statute, it appears that he read the statute
to prohibit only signing papers and appearing in court. This outcome,
that even uncompensated representation of indigents who are being
prosecuted by an agency remote from the representatives' employer is
prohibited, is compelled by the clear language of section 205.182
In a 1977 case, federal district Judge Richey offered the opinion
that Section 205 "forbids a federal employee from representing any-
one before an agency or court.""8 3 This sweeping statement appears
to overlook the language in section 205 that precludes the representa-
tion of others in any "matter in which the United States is a party or
has a direct and substantial interest," and to suggest that a federal
government lawyer would have a conflict based on the forum in
which the matter is presented, regardless of who was the adversary.
In Bachman v. Pertschuk,'" the case in which this statement
was made, Judge Richey interpreted the exception in the statute which
allows federal government employees to represent others in "disci-
plinary, loyalty or other personnel . . . administrative proceedings,"
not to allow federal employees to handle such matters in court."8 5
179. United States v. Bailey, 498 F.2d 677, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
180. Id at 679-80.
181. IM
182. The same interpretation is offered by an opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel that
representation of indigent criminal defendants by attorneys for the federal government was
prohibited by the statute because of the interest of the United States in those cases. Govern-
ment Lawyer's Pro Bono Activities in the District of Columbia, 4 Op. O.L.C. (Vol. B) 800
(1980).
183. Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973, 976 (D.D.C. 1977). Presumably he meant
"anyone" other than the United States.
184. Id
185. This was based on the equation of "administration proceedings" with administrative
proceedings, and a further interpretation that the exception allows only defense of actions
brought by the agency for "disciplinary, loyalty or other personnel reasons." Id. at 976.
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In particular, the judge found that because of a conflict of interest, a
Federal Trade Commission attorney was disqualified from representing
a class of which he was a member in an employment discrimination
case against the FTC. The court noted that there might be a conflict
between his personal interests and those of others in the class.186
If federal employees have been prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 205, virtually none of those prosecutions has resulted in a pub-
lished court opinion. In 1970 one case was reported1"7 in which one
person was charged with the type of conduct that was sought to be
prohibited by the original version of section 205.188 In U.S. v.
Sweig,8 9 Martin Sweig, who was an assistant to Speaker John W.
McCormack of the United States House of Representatives, was
charged with having appeared before the Securities and Exchange
Commission as an agent for a company regarding the Commission's
suspension of trading in that company's stock. This was part of a
scheme under which Sweig and his collaborator, who was not a gov-
ernment employee, were alleged to have agreed "to have the latter
take fees from people with matters before government agencies ir ex-
change for undertaking 'to exert the influence of the office of the
Speaker of the House to said agencies'."'" The conduct other than
the SEC appearances was charged under another statute. 9
One puzzling question about the scope of section 205 is whether
a federal government lawyer may engage in pro bono work involving
lobbying on legislation or filing comments in an agency rulemaking
proceeding if the lawyer's position on the bill is contrary to that of
186. Id at 977.
187. United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
188. I found no other reported cases involving criminal charges for violation of section
205.
189. 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1151-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
190. Id at 1155.
191. Sweig tried unsuccessfully to have the charge under section 205 dismissed, urging
that it was inapplicable because he was not an attorney nor was he a legal agent for the
company on whose behalf he appeared before the SEC. Md at 1156. In declining to dismiss
this count of the indictment, the court found that "the strict common-law notion of 'agency'
does not necessarily exhaust the meaning of the prohibition." Id at 1157.
One other case in which the application of section 205 might have been consistent
with the original intention of the statute is Refine Constr. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 56
(1987). There the court found that the Veterans Administration has not acted improperly in
declining to award a contract to a company which had been represented in negotiations with
the agency by an engineer who was a full-time employee of the Veterans Administration. The
engineer was not prosecuted under the statute, but the court, upon examining his conduct,
found that he had violated it. It was not clear whether the engineer had been compensated
for his services. Id
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the executive branch. The current law defines a "covered matter" to
include any judicial or other "proceeding, application, request for a
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge,
accusation, arrest or other particular matter."'" This language in-
cludes any sort of adjudicative proceeding, but not legislative pro-
ceedings.193 Perhaps, then, 18 U.S.C. section 205 does not prohibit
legislative advocacy on behalf of anyone before Congress or any
other legislative body, even if the federal government is opposing the
position advocated by the client of the government attorney. The
statute may not prohibit filing comments on a proposed rule on be-
half of any person, regardless of the position taken by any govern-
ment agency in that matter, because rulemaking is legislative rather
than adjudicative behavior. This result, like other effects of the stat-
ute, is anomalous. The barrier imposed by the statute fails to prohibit
some activity that would pose an actual or apparent conflict of inter-
est
194
V. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF PRO BoNo WORK
In addition to the restrictions imposed by section 205, pro bono
work by federal attorneys is restricted by various federal regulations.
These regulations in some cases create administrative barriers to the
performance of pro bono work that are more onerous than those
imposed by section 205. To avoid section 205, a federal government
lawyer need only select pro bono projects in which the government
has no interest, such as domestic relations cases or employment dis-
crimination complaints against private employers. The administrative
restrictions may have a greater negative impact than section 205 on
pro bono work because they apply to nearly all pro bono projects,
regardless of who is the client.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 205.
193. In explaining the types of proceedings encompassed by the term "particular matter",
Robert Jordan explains that "the conflict of interest laws cover 'adjudicative' situations,
whether formal or informal and whether or not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
or similar procedures; the laws do not cover 'rulemaldng.'" Jordan, Ethical Issues Arising
from Present or Past Government Service, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR
ATTORNEYS 171, 177 (1978). Since the current definition of "covered matter" includes the
term "particular matter" and numerous examples of such matters, it appears that the 1989
amendments did not change the scope of section 205.
194. I recommend, infra notes 299-300 and accompanying text, that the statute should be
amended to make the government attorney's client her agency. In identifying conflicts with
the lawyer's agency, the potentially conflicting activity should be expanded to include any
advocacy adverse to the agency, whether before a court, a legislative body or an agency.
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A. The Executive Order and the OPM Regulations
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 11222,195 which dealt with
ethical conduct of federal employees, the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment promulgated regulations"9 addressing restrictions on outside
activities by federal government employees."9 In addition, OPM of-
fers guidance to agencies on this issue in the Federal Personnel Man-
ual.1 98 The Comptroller General has issued some opinions on leave
that may be granted to federal employees for pro bono work; these
are binding on the agencies. As directed by the executive order and
the OPM regulations, most agencies have issued their own rules on
outside activities by government lawyers.199 Some appear in the
Code of Federal Regulations,"ro others are embodied in agency
memoranda2°1 and others in letters by agency general counsels re-
195. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees, Exec. Order
No. 11222, 3 C.F.R. 156, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,590, 34 Fed. Reg. 7381
(1971). This executive order was published in the U.S. Code immediately following 18
U.S.C. section 201. It appears to be intended to implement the statute.
The executive order was revoked in 1989 by Principles of Ethical Conduct for Gov-
ernment Officers and Employees, Exec. Order No. 12674, 54 Fed. Reg. 15159 (April 12,
1989), which addresses the same issues addressed by the previous order. The OGE regula-
tions issued under the revoked order will remain in effect until amended. Exec. Order No.
12674 § 502(a).
196. 5 C.F.R. § 735 (1988).
197. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at Chapter 990, subchapters 1, 2, and
Sil.
198. The FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL is the "official medium of the Office of Person-
nel Management for issuing personnel instructions, operational guidance, policy statements,
related material on government-wide personnel programs, and advice on good practice in
personnel management to other agencies." FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at
ch. 171, subch. 2-1 (June 10, 1986) Some of the materials in the FEDERAL PERSONNEL MAN-
UAL (FPM) are binding regulations; others are interpretive rules or policy statements, which
are precatory in nature. Memorandum from Chris J. Melcher, Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering to
the Board of Directors, Washington Council of Lawyers 6-7 (July 12, 1988) (on file at
Hofstra Law Review), citing Homer v. Jeffrey, 832 F.2d 1521, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (ex-
pressing doubt that the PM provisions are -law"); American Fed'n. of Gov't Employees,
Local 2782 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 803 F. 2d 737, 741, 742 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(stating that some of the provisions of the FPM are rules). In general, the contents of the
FPM are binding to the extent that they are issued in conformance with procedural require-
ments imposed by Congress for rulemaking. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04
(1979). See National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 685 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. La.
1988) (addressing whether the FPM can provide independent mandatory requirements).
199. See, e.g., infra notes 244-86 and accompanying text (citing to examples of these
regulations).
200. See, e.g., Department of Justice Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. §§ 45.735-9,
45.735-12 (1990).
201. See, e.g., Memorandum from John M. Fowler, General Counsel, Department of
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sponding to inquiries.2°
The Office of Personnel Management's "Agency Regulations
Governing Ethical and Other Conduct and Responsibilities of Employ-
ees"2°3 require each agency to issue regulations addressing the mat-
ters addressed in the OPM regulations. The regulations do not address
directly whether federal government attorneys may perform pro bono
work. They prohibit the ,receipt of gifts, entertainment, and favors in
exchange for any service relating to official duties. 2 4 They prohibit
"outside employment or other outside activity not compatible with the
full and proper discharge of the duties and responsibilities of ...
Government employment., 25 These include acceptance of anything
of value that might create a conflict of interest.0 6 They prohibit the
acquisition of financial interests which conflict with duties to the gov-
ernment.2' They prohibit the use of government property, including
equipment and supplies, "for other than officially approved activi-
ties.,208
The Federal Personnel Manual addresses the question of attorney
pro bono work directly. In January 1981, before the current FPM
policy was written, the Attorney General of the United States recom-
mended that federal agencies adopt policies encouraging pro bono
activities by agency attorneys.2 9 The impact of this resolution is
evident in some of the policies.210 In 1985, however, the Office of
Transportation, to all DOT attorneys (Apr. 9, 1981) (on file at Hofstra Law Review) [here-
inafter DOT memorandum]; Department of Commerce Secretary's Circular No. 32, Pro Bono
Activities by Attorneys in Commerce Department Legal Office (Jan. 19, 1981) (on file at
Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Department of Commerce Circular].
202. See, e.g., General Accounting Office letter No. B-215476 from Harry R. Van Cleve,
Acting General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to David Isbell, President of the D.C.
Bar (July 2, 1984).
203. 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201-735.210 (1990).
204. 5 C.F.R. § 735.202 (1990).
205. 5 C.F.R. § 735.203(a).
206. 5 C.F.R. § 735.203(a)(1) (1990).
207. 5 C.F.R. § 735.204 (a)(1) (1990).
208. 5 C.F.R. § 735.205 (1990).
209. Referred to in Department of Commerce Circular, supra note 206 (implementing
United States Attorney General's recommendation, dated Jan. 5, 1981). The Department of
Transportation explains that "[plursuant to Executive Order 12146, the Federal Legal Council
recently resolved to encourage pro bono activities by federal attorneys and asked federal
agencies to adopt the Council's proposed policy statement." DOT memorandum, supra note
201 (regarding "DOT Policy Governing pro bono Activities by Attorneys").
210. The Department of Transportation guidelines may have provided the model for the
more permissive of the existing guidelines. In 1984, David Isbell, then President of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Bar, circulated proposed guidelines on pro bono work by federal govern-
ment attorneys. This draft resembled regulations already in place at the Department of Trans-
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Personnel Management issued a version of Chapter 990 that imposed
many restrictions on pro bono work. The 1985 document noted that
federal government attorneys may have an ethical obligation to do pro
bono work, but urged that "it can be argued that service as counsel
to the Federal Government is pro bono publico by definition."2"'
The manual then stated that government lawyers (a) may not
perform pro bono services on Government time or at Government ex-
pense;212 (b) may not use the services of other government employ-
ees to spend government time "to carry out otherwise impermissible
pro bono services""'; (c) may not ask clerical employees to help
with pro bono work "even on off-duty hours on a voluntary ba-
sis."214 The subchapter then asserted that "the United States Govern-
ment as a client is entitled to the same degree of loyalty as any other
client. 21
Appended to this subchapter was a policy statement by the Fed-
eral Legal Council opposing amendment of 18 U.S.C. section 205,
and asserting that the boundary drawn by the law is necessary. The
statement assumes that the client of a federal attorney is the entire
federal government, and asserts that "[ilt does not seem useful to
forego the existing clear-cut rule to create an amorphous situation
demanding constant (and somewhat speculative) case-by-case analysis
of whether a given government attorney's pro bono representation
would raise such conflicts. 2 6 The impact of this policy statement
is evident in other of the regulations.
Constance Berry Newman, Director of OPM, adopted a more
portation. See e.g., Letter from David Isbell, President of the D.C. Bar, to 3.C. Argetsinger,
Esq., General Counsel of ACTION (Apr. 4, 1984) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
211. Md
212. Id. § 2-2(c). In support of this the FPM cites 61 Comp. Gen. 652 (1982), dicussed
infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
213. Id
214. It Here the FPM cites General Accounting Office Letter B-215476 from Harry R.
Van Cleve, Acting General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to David B. Isbell, President,
District of Columbia Bar (July 2, 1984).
215. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at Chapter 990, subchapter 2-2(d).
216. id, Appendix A at A-1. The Federal Legal Council was composed of the Attorney
General and the General Counsels of the federal government. The statement urges that if the
scope of section 205 were limited, problems in limiting the scope of section 205 would
occur because of the overlap of agency functions and the need for information-sharing be-
tween agencies. It urges that "[i]t is, to say the least, a questionable management practice,
with dubious effects on morale, to have one employee litigating against another." Id. The
statement does not explain what proposed amendment of section 205 is being opposed. Since
the statement is dated March 14, 1985 the Council may have been responding to the 1984
Kastenmeier bill.
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positive tone in guidance offered to the agencies regarding pro bono
work by attorneys in a memo issued to heads of all departments and
agencies in 1990.
I ask you to encourage employees to participate in volunteer
activities associated with helping those who need legal counsel and
other services. In addition, I ask you to be as sensitive and flexible
as possible in scheduling work for these employees and in granting
annual leave or leave without pay [consistent with existing regula-
tions] ....
I believe the end result of our effort to help those in need will
serve to improve our country and the Federal Government.217
Newman wrote this memo in response to a letter from the Wash-
ington Council of Lawyers,2" a D.C. public interest bar group, re-
questing changes in regulations relating to pro bono work.2 9
Newman's memo was followed a year later by a new set of
policies, included in the Federal Personnel Manual, on pro bono legal
service by federal employees." 0 This is part of a general policy en-
couraging volunteer work and public service, consistent with President
Bush's Points of Light Initiative. The new OPM policy asserts:
Employees of the Federal Government can play a significant
217. Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies from Constance Berry
Newman, Director, Office of Personnel Management (Feb. 26, 1990) (regarding pro bono pu-
bico Services by Federal Government Attorneys and other Federal Employees) (on file at
Hofstra Law Review).
218. In the fall of 1989, I became a member of the Board of Directors of the Washing-
ton Council of Lawyers. This provided some opportunities to discuss the issues addressed
here with others concerned about them. I had already become a consultant to ACUS at the
time I joined the Council Board. To avoid role confusion, I did not become actively involved
in the Councirs advocacy of more pro bono opportunities for government lawyers.
219. See Letter from Constance Berry Newman, Director, Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, to Timothy Lindon, Esq., President, Washington Council of Lawyers (Feb. 26, 1990)
(stating that it is not appropriate for OPM to require agency support of pro bono work since
each must give primary attention to its own mission, but noting that she issued a memo to
agency heads reminding them of opportunities for pro bono work under existing law) (on file
at Hofstra Law Review). Also in 1989 Charles Ruff, the president of the District of Colum-
bia Bar, made the issue of pro bono work by government lawyers a priority, and created a
committee to promote pro bono work by federal and District government employees. Ruff,
Government Lawyers Under Restraint, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER (1989). The committee's
goals include the study of barriers experienced by government lawyers to participating in bar
activities and to doing pro bono work. The committee intends to examine steps that might be
taken to remove those barriers. Bar to Reach Out to Government Lawyers, D.C. BAR REP.,
Dec.Jan. 1990, at 1.
220. FPM Letter 992-1 (April 19, 1991) (the relevant part of which is identified as su-
perseding FPM Chapter 990, Subchapter 2).
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role in providing legal assistance to those in need ....
OPM encourages agencies to be supportive of employees who
wish to provide volunteer services to help those in need of legal
assistance. Attorneys in the Federal Government, in keeping with
their ethical obligation to the system of justice, may provide legal
services pro bono publico to those in need, when such activities do
not present a conflict of interest with their job responsibilities.21
The general statement of policy takes a tone virtually diametri-
cally opposite from that of the previous OPM policy. The letter
makes concrete suggestions of ways that federal agencies can encour-
age their employees to do volunteer work, including:
-flexible or compressed work schedules . . .for employees who
wish to engage in volunteer activities during normal working hours
-grant[ing of] annual leave, leave without pay, or, in very limited
circumstances, excused absence . . . [to facilitate volunteer activi-
ties].=
* The letter explains that excused absence (also called "administra-
tive leave")
should be limited to those situations in which the employee's volun-
teer service, in the agency's determination, . . . is directly related to
the department's or agency's mission; is officially sponsored or
sanctioned by the head of the department or agency; or will clearly
enhance the professional development or skills of the employee in
his or her current position.'
While OPM accepts the idea that the entire United States govern-
ment is the client of every federal government lawyer, this policy
makes major strides in encouraging pro bono work. If these policies
are incorporated into the regulations of the agencies, lawyers will be
subject to many fewer barriers to participation in pro bono activities.
221. Id. at 3.
222. Id. at 2.
223. Id. The letter also makes clear that, contrary to previous policy, "federal employees
may use the services of other Federal employees on Government time to carry out pro bono
services that satisfy one or more of the criteria for conducting such activities on an excused
absence basis, provided appropriate supervisory approval has been granted." Id. at 4.
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B. Comptroller General Opinions
The Comptroller General of the United States has authority over
the use of appropriated funds and, therefore, issues opinions on topics
such as the use of administrative leave z2 4 or government resources
for outside activities.' Though, in general, federal employees may
not be excused from work without loss of pay or vacation time, brief
periods of administrative leave are proper for certain types of activi-
ties. These include participation in civil defense programs, voting, do-
nating blood, tardiness, taking examinations pertinent to federal em-
ployment, attending conferences, and representing employee organiza-
tions.' However, there are many other activities in which the
Comptroller General has found that administrative leave was not
justified.
The most directly relevant of these decisions is In re Elmer
DeRitter, Jr., 7 which concerns employees of the Veteran's Admin-
istration (now the Department of Veterans' Affairs) who had been as-
signed to represent an indigent criminal defendant and who requested
"court leave" (generally granted for service as a juror or witness) to
do so.2 21 The Comptroller General held hat "an employee in this
situation may not be excused on court leave or administrative leave
and may be compensated by the Government only to the extent he
has to his credit and requests a grant of annual leave."' This ac-
tivity was not regarded as furthering a federal function, and since it
might have required substantial time, administrative leave was regard-
ed as inappropriate." The Comptroller General acknowledged that
"it may be unfair to force a Government attorney, who is required to
be a member of a bar to qualify for his position, to use annual leave
224. Administrative leave is not authorized by statute, but agencies are permitted to allow
employees brief periods of leave without charging the time to annual leave or reducing the
employee's pay. See FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at Supp. 990-2, Book
630, Subchapter S11.
225. The extent to which opinions of the Comptroller General are binding is a matter of
some controversy. Conversation with Stuart Rick, Office of General Counsel, Office of Per-
sonnel Management (Feb. 23, 1990).
226. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at Supp. 990-2, Book 630, Subchap-
ter S11.
227. 61 Comp. Gen. 652 (1982).
228. Id. at 652-53.
229. Id at 652.
230. Id at 653-54.
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to meet this obligation of bar membership.""1 However, this con-
sideration was not determinative. 2
The DeRitter decision relied on a 1965 decision in which the
Comptroller General held that a federal agency could not establish a
policy allowing administrative leave to attorneys appointed by a court
to represent indigent criminal defendants. 3 In that case, the Civil
Service Commission questioned whether the answer would be differ-
ent if the amount of time involved was a maximum of three to five
days; by its silence on this distinction, the Comptroller General ap-
pears to indicate that the amount of time involved is not relevant.
Instead, the key issue was held to be "whether the service performed
by federally employed attorneys in such cases is in furtherance of a
Federal function for which the employing agency's appropriations are
available."2-4 Otherwise, the decision indicates that an act of Con-
gress would be needed to make administrative leave available for
court-appointed representation of indigents." 5
It should be noted that the DeRitter decision was written before
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility had been written.
The Civil Service Commission letter cited Canon 4 of the rules of the
Supreme Court of Missouri, discouraging requests by members of the
bar to be excused from court-appointed representation of indigents,
but the Comptroller General seems to have regarded Canon 4 as
something less than binding law. During the intervening twenty-five
years, most states have developed more sophisticated codes of ethics
and have set up or expanded lawyer regulatory agencies. 6 Ethical
rules imposed on lawyers are given greater legal effect in 1992 than
they were in 1965, among them the obligation to do pro bono
work' 7 Perhaps if a similar case were presented in the current le-
231. Id. at 654.
232. Id
233. To the Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 44 Comp. Gen. 643 (1965).
234. Id. at 644.
235. Id The decision points out that such a statute mandated the allowance of leave only
for federal employees serving on juries. See id. at 653 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 6322(a) and (b)
(1988)).
236. S. GILLERS & R. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS
(1989).
237. The ethical obligation to represent indigents was raised and rejected by the Comp-
troller General in DeRitter as well, on the basis that government attorneys were not granted
administrative leave to study for the bar exam. The decision reflects a position that the gov-
ernment may require attorneys to fulfill obligations to the bar on their own time. 61 Comp.
Gen. at 654 (1982).
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gal context, the request for administrative leave would be granted.
Another Comptroller General decision involved a request for
three days per month of administrative leave by a HUD employee
who had male breast cancer, to participate in an NIH study of his
cancer."8 In that case three days per month was found to constitute
"brief periods of time" for which administrative leave could be al-
lowed. In addressing whether the activity is in furtherance of an
agency function, the Comptroller General noted with apparent approv-
al that this project was "part of a cooperative effort between HUD
and NIH" and that "the employee's performance could benefit from
his participation in the protocol." 9
In another decision, an employee of the Department of Labor
was found not entitled to administrative leave for six weeks of almost
uncompensated2  drought relief service for Africare, a private non-
profit organization. Although the work she did in Africa during this
period was similar to that performed in her official capacity, she was
not entitled to administrative leave. Her supervisors urged that the
experience contributed to her ability to perform her official duties
more effectively, but the Comptroller General was unpersuaded. The
decision notes the "substantial period of time" of the employee's ab-
sence.
24
While these decisions articulate some guidelines for decisions on
administrative leave, the Federal Personnel Manual makes clear that
each agency has broad discretion regarding these determinations.2"
238. In re Department of Housing and Urban Development Employee-Administrative
Leave, 67 Comp. Gen. 126 (1987).
239. I See supra pp. 1145-46 (discussing benefits to federal attorneys' lawyering skills
and professional development from doing public service work, resulting in increased work
satisfaction and possibly leading to increased duration of federal service).
Another Comptroller General decision held that it was permissible for the General
Services Administration to grant administrative leave to employees to provide personal servic-
es to Federal credit unions. In re Administrative Leave-Fed. Employees Providing Advice
and Support to Federal Credit Unions, 63 Comp. Gen. 542 (1984) (examining the intangible
benefits that would accrue to the federal government from allowing the service and noting
that "[the administrator] states that it is the policy of the United States Government to en-
courage [and] foster the operation of federal employee credit unions and that the thrift and
welfare of GSA employees contribute to high morale, diminish temptation towards theft, and
benefit the government").
240. The employee was paid $75 per week for the service provided. In re Secretary of
Labor, B-156287 (June 26, 1974) (unpublished opinion).
241. Id.
242. FIDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, supra note 23, at Supp. 990-2, Book 630, Subchap-
ter Sl explains that "[wjith a few exceptions, agencies determine administratively situations
in which they will excuse employees from duty without charge to leave and may by adminis-
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The Comptroller General stated in one decision that "each agency is
responsible for determining those situations in which excusing em-
ployees from work without charge to leave is appropriate under the
general guidance of the decisions of this Office."
243
C. Agency Regulatiois
Most federal agencies have rules imposing restrictions on outside
activities by government employees.2' These prohibit activity that
would give rise to an actual or apparent conflict of interest based on
personal financial interest, the interest of another, or possible revela-
tion of confidential information. 5 These regulations are similar to
the corresponding set of OPM regulations, but each agency has its
own variations on the rules. Some of these rules directly address pro
bono work by government attorneys; others impose more general
restrictions.
1. Permission To Do Pro Bono Work
Some agency regulations set the policy on pro bono work by
government attorneys. The regulations of the Department of Justice,
the largest employer of attorneys in the federal government, provide
that:
[e]mployees are encouraged to provide public interest professional
services so long as such services do not interfere with their official
responsibilities. Such public interest services must be conducted
without compensation, and during off-duty hours or while on leave.
Leave will be granted for court appearances or other necessary
incidents of representation in accordance with established policy on
leave administration .... 246
The Department of Justice regulations prohibit professional or practice
or outside employment if:
(1) The activity will in any manner interfere with the proper and
effective performance of the employee's official duties;
(2) The activity will create or appear to create a conflict of interest;
trative regulation place any limitations or restrictions they feel are needed."
243. In re Administrative Leave, 63 Comp. Gen. at 544.
244. See infra notes 246-79 and accompanying text.
245. Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-9,10 (1990).
246. 28 C.F.1L § 45.735-9 (c)(1) (1990). The regulation also permits attorneys to repre-
sent federal employees in Equal Employment Opportunity complaint procedures, and prohibits
employees from seeking an award of attorney's fees for public interest work.
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(4) The employee's position in the Department of Justice will influ-
ence or appear to influence the outcome of the matter;
(5) The activity will involve assertions that are contrary to the inter-
ests or positions of the United States; or
(6) The activity involves any criminal matter or proceeding whether
Federal, State or local, or any other matter or proceeding in which
the United States (including the District of Columbia) government is
a party or has a direct and substantial interest.
247
Some of the other agencies, including the Department of Com-
merce and the Department of Transportation, also encourage pro bono
work by agency attorneys. They mandate the creation of systems
within the agencies to notify agency attorneys of opportunities and to
coordinate with organizations that refer clients who need pro bono
assistance."4 Some agencies just have a general policy encouraging
pro bono work. The Department of the Navy, for example, has no
official policy but issued a statement explaining that "the Office of
the General Counsel actively supports and encourages individual ini-
tiative in furtherance of the ideals and goals of the legal profes-
sion."t9
2. Definition of Pro Bono Work
"Public interest service" is defined in the Department of Justice
and some other regulations as service to a client who cannot afford to
pay a lawyer; efforts to protect public rights, to further the purpose of
a charitable, religious, civic or educational organization, or "services
to improve the administration of justice."'
3. Permission/Notice Procedures
Most of the agency regulations set up procedures by which a
lawyer may seek approval of some outside activity."si Generally,
247. M, § 45.735-9 (f).
248. Department of Commerce Circular, supra note 206; Dot memorandum, supra note
201.
249. Statement Concerning Pro Bono Activities, Department of the Navy, Office of the
General Counsel (Nov. 9, 1989).
250. Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-9 (c)(3) (1990). See also supra note 247.
251. E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 0.735.13 (1990) (Department of Labor); Canons of Conduct, 49
C.F.R. § 1000.735-17 (b) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 29 C.F.R. § 100.113 (c) (Na-
tional Labor Relations Board). These regulations vary in what they require of the attorneys
seeking to engage in outside activities, and in whether they impose reporting requirements on
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they require that the employee who wants to undertake an outside
activity submit a written request to the appropriate ethics official
describing in detail the activity and the amount of time involved. 2
The Department of Justice regulations require that notice be given of
intent to provide such services to the head of the employee's divi-
sion."53 The Department of Education regulations require prior ap-
proval of outside activity, unless "the outside activity will not - (i)
[be performed during the employee's regular work hours; (ii)
[a]ggregate 10 or more hours a week; (iii) [i]nvolve public writing or
speaking; ... and (iv) [r]easonably raise questions under the stan-
dards in this part."
2 4
4. Prohibition of Private Practice
Some agency regulations emphasize the prohibition of outside
activity rather than the desirability of pro bono service. Such regula-
tions do not include an exhortation to attorneys to do pro bono work,
and tend to emphasize what is prohibited rather than what is permit-
ted. The National Labor Relations Board states that "[t]he private
practice of law either individually or with another person"2 55 is "in-
compatible with the full and proper discharge of the duties and re-
sponsibilities of ... Government employment."256  The regulations
mention the possible exception of occasional involvement in "family
or civic matters."2'
the supervisors. The NLRB regulations require an annual report from each division chief
detailing any outside employment requested and whether the request was granted. The Depart-
ment of the Army imposed similar requirements of advance written permission and agency
reporting on outside activity. AR 690-300, Interim Change No. 109, Department of the Army
(Dec. 18, 1985) (expired Dec. 18, 1987).
In contrast to these requirements of advance written approval, the Department of
Transportation Guidelines require that "[n]otice of intention to provide pro bono services shall
be given in writing to the head of the employee's division," and then provides for resolution
of any disagreements about the work to be done. Memorandum from John M Fowler, Gener-
al Counsel of the Department of Transportation, to all DOT Attorneys (Apr. 9, 1981) (dis-
cussing DOT Policy Governing Pro Bono Activities by Attorneys).
252. E.g., Environmental Protection Agency regulations, Procedures for Permission to
Engage in Outside Employment or Other Outside Activity, 40 C.F.R. Part 3, Subpart E, Ap-
pendix A (1990).
253. Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-9 (c)(2) (1990).
254. 34 C.F.R. § 73.22 (b)(2) (1990).
255. 29 C.F.R. § 100.113 (a) (1990).
256. Id.
257. l § 100.113 (a)(1). Similarly, the Army regulations state that "[b]ecause of the
greater potential for actual or apparent conflicts of interests, the outside practice of law par-
ticularly is discouraged.- AR 690-300, Interim Change No. 109, Department of the Army
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The Solicitor's Office of the Department of Labor issued a
memo to its attorneys in 1982 to impose stricter "limitations on the
outside practice of law than apply to other outside activities of attor-
neys."z8 The memo defines activity requiring specific advance
clearance "to include advisory or consultatory services on behalf of a
litigant, a possible litigant, or a client in addition to actual representa-
tion of a client." 9 The memo prohibits any "affiliation or associa-
tion with a law firm or another attorney. ' 260
The GAO personnel regulations are quite restrictive also. They
state:
Representation Before the Government. Except as specifically per-
mitted by 18 U.S.C. [§§] 203 and 205, permission to engage in
outside employment will not be granted for the purpose of repre-
senting any employer, client, or other person before the Federal
Government or, where compensation is received, for the purpose of
assisting in such representation. This prohibition is statutory and
applies even to representation occurring as part of the normal mem-
bership activities of any of the organizations specified in paragraph
2b, above. 6
The prohibition of section 205 is of representation of any person
against rather than before the government.262 This rule appears to
read the statute to prohibit any appearance in any federal court or
other tribunal (other than in performance of official duties) against
any adversary. In fact the statute prohibits acting as agent or attorney
(Dec. 18, 1985) (expired Dec. 18, 1987). These Army regulations do qualify the prohibition,
stating that pro bono services are permitted, as long as they are performed within the re-
strictions imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 205, the Federal Personnel Manual Chapter 990, and these
regulations. Id.
The Department of Energy regulations assert that engaging in private practice is in-
compatible with a lawyer's performance of his or her official duties, but they exempt from
the section in which this prohibition appears any participation in the affairs of a non-profit or
public service organization. 10 C.F.R. § 1010.204 (a)(3)(i) and (g)(2) (1990).
258. Memorandum from T. Timothy Ryan, Jr, Solicitor of Labor, Regarding Procedures
for Reporting and Clearing the Outside practice of Law by Attorneys of the Solicitor's Office
(May 27, 1982) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
259. 1at
260. Id. This is in contrast to the Department of Labor regulations, which state that
"[t]here is . . . no general prohibition against Department employees holding jobs, financial
interest, or engaging in outside business or professional activities." 29 C.F.R. § 0.735.11
(1990).
261. General Accounting Office, Code of Ethics Including Employee Responsibilities and
Conduct, GAO Order 2735.1 (Sept. 7, 1988) (part of GAO Operations Manual) (emphasis
added).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
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against the federal government.263 The statute would not prohibit
litigation of a pro bono employment discrimination case against a
private employer in federal court. The GAO rules disapprove of court
appearances for other than official purposes.
21
5. Reiteration of Language of Section 205
Many agency regulations on outside activities reiterate or para-
phrase the language of section 205, but some of these, like the GAO
regulations, prohibit more than is prohibited by section 205. For ex-
ample, the statute prohibits acting as "agent or attorney" for anyone
in a matter in which the United States is a party or has a direct and
substantial interest.2' The statute prohibits actual representation,
whereas the Department of Justice regulations prohibit "activity",
which may include non-representational assistance as well.Y
6. Prohibition on Federal Court Appearances
Some federal agency policies267 specifically address the lan-
guage in section 205 that allows representation of federal employees
in personnel administration proceedings. Some agencies have incorpo-
rated a broad reading of the decision in Bachman v. Pertschul 68
into their regulations, and assert (as the court arguably did in that
decision) that section 205 permits federal employees to represent other
employees against the government in personnel proceedings, but does
not permit federal court appearances by federal attorneys in such cas-
263. Id But see Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977).
264. Rule 9(d) of chapter 5 of the GAO Code of Ethics states that "[p]ermission to
engage in outside employment will not be granted for the purpose of representing clients in
court except in cases not prohibited by law where approved by the General Counsel for the
purpose of a specific appearance." The lesser restrictions on non-litigation activity also are
reflected in a rule allowing preparation of the tax returns of others. Id. at rule 9(e).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 205 (2) (1988).
266. Id GAO Code of Ethics at Rule 9(c). This interpretation also appears in the sources
cited supra note 201 which provide that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 205, "no employee
shall engage in pro bono activity in which the United States is a party or has a direct and
substantial interest."
Some of the regulations refer to 18 U.S.C. section 205 without elaboration. See, e.g.,
29 C.F.R. § 100.122(d) (1990) (NLRB regulations mandating that employees acquaint them-
selves with the statute).
267. See, e.g., supra note 201.
268. 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977).
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es.269 The Department of Commerce circular,2"' on the other hand,
interprets Bachman v. Pertschuk narrowly and finds it not to preclude
court representation in such cases. 1
7. Rules on Teaching, Lecturing and Writing
Some pro bono work involves writing articles, teaching, or giv-
ing lectures. Most agencies offer qualified encouragement to federal
government employees to do teaching, lecturing and writing, but they
often prohibit receipt of honoraria' or limit the amount that em-
ployees may be paid for such activities.27 Some agencies prohibit
employees from using expertise acquired in federal employment in
their teaching; others prohibit revealing information acquired in feder-
al employment that is not generally available to the public.274
8. Rules on Membership in Professional Societies
Some regulations are explicit in their permission to federal em-
ployees to be members of or officers in professional societies275 or
other civic, religious or charitable organizations. The GAO, for exam-
ple, requires advance approval of most outside activities, but provides
that "approval is not required to .. .engage in the normal member-
ship activities of a charitable, religious, professional, social, fraternal,
nonprofit educational and recreational, public service, homeowners, or
civic organization. Normal membership activities include those ordi-
narily performed on a noncompensated basis by members." 276 This
269. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-702 (1990) (Department of Health and Human Servic-
es prohibitions on outside employment activities).
270. Department of Commerce Circular, supra note 201.
271. The DOT memorandum, supra note 201, reports that the Federal Legal Council
resolved that this case "should be interpreted narrowly so as to limit the decision to its
facts". The attorney in Bachman v. Pertschuk wished to represent a class in a personnel
administration proceeding in court. He was not permitted to do so because of a specific
conflict between his duties to his employer and to the class. 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C.
1977).
272. 7 C.F.R. § 0.735-13(i) (1990) (U.S. Department of Agriculture).
273. The Department of Education regulations specify a $2,000 maximum for an appear-
ance, speech, or article. 34 C.F.R. § 73.22(f) (1990). See 2 U.S.C. § 441(i) (1988).
274. 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-706 (a)(3) (1990) (Department of Health and Human Services).
275. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 73.735-707 (1990) (Department of Health and Human Servic-
es).
276. GAO, Code of Ethics Including Employee Responsibilities and Conduct, GAO Order
2735.1, Chapter 5, Rule 3(b) (Sept. 7, 1988) (part of GAO Operations Manual).
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rule appears to permit participation in bar activities, or membership
and participation in the activities of a law reform organization without
prior approval.
In July of 1991 the Office of Government Ethics issued a pro-
posed rule revising the conduct code for executive branch employees,
which would have restricted sharply the participation of lawyers in
bar association activities by prohibiting the use of administrative leave
for such activity unless it was directly related to the employee's offi-
cial duty.277 This proposal was withdrawn by OGE after 980 nega-
tive comments were filed during the comment period.27
9. Prohibition on Use of Government Time
Most agencies require that pro bono work be conducted "during
off-duty hours or while on leave."279 This requires that attorneys
use only evening and weekend hours for pro bono projects; any day-
time hours are deducted from vacation time. The Departments of
Transportation and Commerce make compensatory time arrangements
available to accommodate pro bono work.28° In addition, the Depart-
ment of Commerce policy provides that some administrative leave
"(use of official time)" may be granted.281
10. Prohibition on Use of Government Resources
Most agency regulations prohibit the use of government property,
including equipment and supplies, for any activity not officially ap-
proved.282 The Department of Commerce permits "the reasonable
use of government libraries, offices, [and] equipment.""8 3 The De-
partment of Transportation permits such use of resources also, but
points out that "[a]utomated research systems, for which direct user
charges are made to the agency, shall not be available for pro bono
Work.,
,284
277. Standards of Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Proposed Rule, 33
Fed. Reg. 3378-01 (July 23, 1991).
278. Causey, supra note 75.
279. See id. at Rule 9(a).
280. See sources cited supra note 201.
281. Department of Commerce Circular, supra note 201.
282. 29 C.F.R. § 1600.735-205(e)(i) (1990); see 7 C.F.R. § 0.735-13 (a)(9) (1990) (U.S.
Department of Agriculture).
283. Department of Commerce Circular, supra note 201.
284. DOT memorandum, supra note 201.
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11. Prohibition on Use of Secretaries
In most agencies lawyers may not request assistance from their
secretaries with pro bono projects, on or off government time.285
The Department of Transportation policy, however, permits attorneys
to obtain the assistance of clerical employees in the performance of
pro bono work as long as such assistance does not interfere with
performance of official responsibilities.286
This analysis of the agency regulations reveals considerable vari-
ation in agency policies. Some of the variance may be explained by
the differences in agency operations and the need for specific restric-
tions. Many of the differences, however, may be attributable to differ-
ences in the political ideology of the drafters. Many of the regulations
bear the unmistakable imprint of Reagan administration efforts to
curtail services to the poor. This is a problem not only because it
reflects mistaken policy judgments, but also because federal civil
servants should not be prohibited from volunteer service activity on
their own time as a means of furthering the political agenda of any
administration.
In the revision of these regulations, restrictions should be re-
moved which are not necessary to avoid conflicts of interest or abuse
of resources. Government employees should be given as much flexi-
bility as possible in the rules on voluntary service, and should not be
barred from fulfilling their duty as professionals to serve those in
need.
285. E.g., FmERAL PERSONNEL' MANUAL, Chapter 990, Subchapter 2, states that "OPM
has concluded that Federal attorneys engaged in pro bono activities may not solicit Federal
clerical employees to assist with pro bono work even on off-duty hours on a voluntary ba-
sis."
286. The DOT memorandum, supra note 201, states that:
Clerical employees should be encouraged to assist an attorney in the provision of
pro bono services, and, with the consent of the clerical employee, such services
may be provided so long as official responsibilities are not impeded. Any clerical
employee, however, has the right to decline to provide such service, and the deci-
sion of any employee who declines should be fully respected. Attorneys should not
request clerical employees to perform such work after hours, except where the
employee specifically agrees that the work is being volunteered and that the gov-
ernment will not be providing compensation to them.
L. at 2.
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D. Regulation of Pro Bono Work and Other
Outside Activities by Other Governments
Information is not easily available about foreign government
policies on pro bono assistance by government attorneys. However, it
is useful to look briefly at the rules imposed in England and Germa-
ny regulating outside activities by government employees. These
suggest that some western countries are far more flexible than the
United States in the regulation of outside activities, and more specific
in the types of activities prohibited.
The British civil service rules prohibit a much narrower spectrum
of activity than does section 205. A civil servant in Britain may be
barred from acting on behalf of others who have business with his
department. This restriction is imposed only by certain departments,
including the Bureau of Inland Revenue and the Department of the
Environment. 87 In comparing these regulations to those of the Unit-
ed States federal government, Professor Robert Vaughn points out that
the British rules "focus upon a few demonstrated risks .... [includ-
ing] the appearance of improper influence on the decisionmaking
process, conflict of roles, the likelihood of coercion of third parties,
and the improper use of official information.
2 88
In Germany, outside activities of government employees are
regulated by the Federal Public Officials Law. 2 9 As in England, the
rules are more flexible than those of section 205. Generally, public
officials do not need to ask permission to engage in uncompensated
outside activity.2 9  Permission must be requested, however, if the
outside activity involves "engaging in a profession," which presum-
ably includes practicing law.29' The reasons for possible disallow-
ance of the activity include probable impairment of an official inter-
est, such as by hindrance of fulfillment of official responsibilities, or
the appearance of a conflict of interest.' 7 German law prohibits the
use of official time and property for an outside activity unless the
287. Vaughn, Implications of the British Experience on Administrative Regulation of Con-
flicts of Interest in the Federal Civil Service, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 705, 719 (1981).
288. I11 at 721.
289. This law is discussed in Davies, The Public Adninistrative Law Context of Ethics
Requirements for West German and American Public Officials: A Comparative Analysis, 18
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 319 (1988).
290. Id at 357.
291. Id at 358.
292. Id. at 357-58.
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activity is approved by a supervisor as "fulfilling an official inter-
est."29 If resources are used, costs must be reimbursed in most cas-
es 
294
This small window into the choices made by other governments
underlines the assertion that our current system is extremely rigid, and
that other choices are possible.
VI. THE LAW IN OPERATION: REPORTS FROM THE FIELD
I spoke with some federal government attorneys who have done
pro bono work about the nature of their work, and about the approv-
295al/oversight process. Most of the examples that I discuss below
involve some possible technical violation of agency regulations,
though none of those interviewed had abused government time or
resources. Because of the possible violations, I will not use the real
names of these lawyers or their agencies. Absent assurances of con-
fidentiality, my sources would not have shared these stories.
Sheila Jackson was a volunteer mediator while a full-time lawyer
at a federal agency. She did mediation for various programs-each
time she became involved with a mediation program, she wrote a
memo requesting permission to accept cases from that program. Each
request was approved. She did not request permission on a case-by-
case basis, but she declined to handle any cases in which either the
federal government or the D.C. government was a party. Jackson was
not familiar with the particular restrictions imposed by her agency on
the use of agency resources, but assumed that they prohibited any use
293. Id at 361.
294. Id. at 362.
295. I sought names of government lawyers who do pro bono work from various sourc-
es. First I asked organizations that distribute pro bono work for names of federal government
lawyers with whom they work. The staff of these organizations were generally reluctant to
provide names, because they had the impression that the federal government lawyers with
whom they worked were often volunteering in violation of some rule or other and were
skittish about their activities. My research assistants asked agency personnel whom they called
to find out agency policy for names of individuals; these contacts were similarly reluctant to
offer names.
Finally, I simply began asking every government lawyer I spoke with whether he or
she did pro bono work or knew anyone who did. This was more successful. However, I have
talked with only a small number of lawyers, and my technique for identifying them bears no
resemblance to proper sampling procedure. These examples come from different agencies, but
there is no reason to believe that they are "typical" of the experiences of government lawyers
who are interested in pro bono work. I did, however, report all of the examples that were
reported to me.
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for non-official purposes. She avoided using office duplicating equip-
ment (by asking parties to send her copies of any documents she
needed), but she did make phone calls from her office to set up
meetings with people. She needed to call the lawyers representing the
parties to mediation at their offices during regular working hours; it
would have been awkward to try to reach them at home. She did
most of her mediation outside of regular work hours, but sometimes
she took annual leave or used informal flextime (just making up the
hours missed) to compensate for daytime hours devoted to mediation-
related work. Jackson said she never had problems with time conflicts
between her mediation and her official responsibilities. Normally,
mediation sessions were scheduled after office hours; even so, some-
times Jackson had to reschedule them to permit her to work overtime
at her agency.
When asked why she did pro bono work, Jackson explained that
she enjoyed mediation more than litigation, that she enjoyed the con-
tact with people, and found it satisfying to make this contribution of
services.
Andrea Barlow, in addition to her government job, is active on a
D.C. bar committee and serves on the board of directors of an orga-
nization that provides services to indigents. When she began this
work, she got informal oral approval of her activities from her superi-
ors, but later got official written approval after her agency became
more actively concerned with ethical issues than it had been in past
years. She attends board meetings during regular working hours, but
then makes up the hours at other times. She explained that the law-
yers in her office work many more hours than they are obligated to
by law, so she does not worry about spending a few daytime hours
on an outside project.
Barlow said she has not made any real use of government re-
sources for her pro bono work. She does occasionally call someone
from work, and if others involved in her pro bono project call her at
work she does talk to them during regular business hours. She did
once need to do a substantial amount of photocopying for a pro bono
project; for this she used the office copying machine, but brought in
her own paper.
Barlow does feel constrained from some pro bono activities as a
result of being a federal employee. She declined an invitation to
testify before the D.C. City Council because the testimony she would
have given involved taking a position opposing that of the federal
government. But she values her freedom to do some pro bono work,
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and regards it as an essential component of any professional position.
She pointed out that to prohibit lawyers from engaging in pro bono
work would be to treat them "as four-year-olds, not as professionals."
She urged that lawyers can make judgments about the amount of pro
bono work they can do without interfering with their official responsi-
bilities.
Charlie Glass, a federal government lawyer who does EEO work,
is engaged in two pro bono projects. One is to act as police liaison
for a pro-choice organization during attempts by Operation Rescue to
close abortion clinics. The pro-choice group goes to the clinics being
picketed by Operation Rescue and attempts to keep the clinics open.
Glass' role is to talk with the police at the event on behalf of the
pro-choice group, and to communicate information to the group about
what types of conduct will result in arrest, or communicate to the
police the wishes of members of the pro-choice group to file assault
or other charges against Operation Rescue members.
Glass talked with his agency supervisor before taking on this
work about whether there was a conflict of interest. The regulations
of his agency require written approval of such activity. (He did not
know this, but knew of a possible conflict from his law school course
in Professional Responsibility.) His supervisor gave him oral permis-
sion to take on this project, but told him that he should not appear at
the police station or the courthouse on behalf of his client.
Glass' role requires different interventions at each event. He is
not certain whether all of the work he does would meet with the
approval of his supervisor. For example, he talked with the police on
behalf of one pro-choice person who had slashed the tires of an Op-
eration Rescue person, and persuaded the police to issue a citation
rather than make an arrest. Glass commented, "I don't know if [the
supervisor] would have anticipated me doing that stuff .... [I felt I
had a conflict because] this was me representing a citizen against the
government."
Glass' other project is working at an entitlements clinic, helping
people to fill out forms to apply for welfare and social security dis-
ability benefits. He does not represent any of the applicants at hear-
ings. Glass' government work involves some policy issues that are of
interest to the staff of the entitlements clinic, and they sometimes ask
him for information about developing policy. This makes him uncom-
fortable; he declines to answer these questions.
Glass' pro bono work is all done outside of working hours. He
is aware of rules prohibiting use of office equipment. He noted that
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he did call the entitlements clinic from work to make arrangements
about when he would be there. -
Ruth Ferguson did one pro bono landlord-tenant case. In the
office in which she works, no other lawyers have done any pro bono
work, as far as she knows. She first attended a day-long bar-spon-
sored training session on landlord tenant work. When she told her
supervisor that she would be taking annual leave to attend the train-
ing, the supervisor said she would give Ferguson administrative leave
for the day. In talking with another lawyer in a different office of the
same agency, she found out that the other lawyer had been required
to take annual leave for the same event.
Ferguson's case required one two-hour court appearance to get a
continuance. Ferguson recorded this as "non-case time." She did not
charge herself annual leave, she said, because "her boss does not
enforce the annual leave requirements" and she "works more than
forty hours a week anyway." Subsequently, the case was settled
through telephone conversations between Ferguson and her opposing
counsel. These took place during work time. Ferguson indicated that
she is officially allowed only one personal call per day. She said
there is no monitoring of the lawyers' use of the phone in her agen-
cy, and she was not concerned about having broken this rule, because
she does not abuse the phone. She said "Nobody pays attention to the
restrictions, because local calls don't cost anything." Ferguson indicat-
ed that she would not hesitate to use her office computer for pro
bono work. She said that, in general, people in her office do not take
all the rigid rules on use of resources very seriously, and that the
rules are enforced only when there is abuse of resources.
Ferguson said she did not request permission before taking this
case, because she saw no possible conflict. "If I had a question I
would have cleared it but I didn't do anything questionable." She
avoided matters involving the U.S. government because of possible
conflicts. She did mention that she saw no actual conflict in repre-
senting indigent criminal defendants, and said she thought that federal
government attorneys could be in a good position to assist the pro
bono program with representation of defendants, because of the prox-
imity of some government offices to the U.S. Attorney's office.
I asked Ruth Ferguson whether pro bono work was encouraged
or discouraged by her agency. She said the only serious barriers were
the rule requiring use of annual leave for daytime work, and the fact
that she travels a great deal in her government work. The travel ef-
fectively prevents her from taking pro bono cases. She mentioned that
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there was some institutional discouragement of pro bono work during
the Reagan administration. She recalled that when Edwin Meese was
Attorney General a memo was sent around saying that working for
the federal government was pro bono work. She does not agree; she
urges that her government work is not pro bono because she is com-
pensated for it.
Ferguson's interest in doing pro bono work is that she perceives
a need for lawyers to represent indigents, and that it makes her feel
good to make a contribution. She noted that she did not intend to
undertake landlord/tenant work when she left the government, so she
was not training herself for a future position. She mentioned that,
having been a tenant, she "had no love lost for landlords," so she
enjoyed representing a tenant. Ferguson indicated that, as far as she
knew, she was the only lawyer in her office who had done any pro
bono work during the four years that she had been there.
Another government lawyer, Amy Pinsky, represents her agency
in equal employment opportunity matters. In her spare time she does
volunteer work for plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases, but
never takes cases against the government. She counsels potential
plaintiffs, negotiates settlements, and once represented a plaintiff in a
hearing before the D.C. Human Rights Commission. She was counsel
of record in the case. The papers did not identify her government
affiliation, but instead her affiliation with the organization that re-
ferred the case to her. Pinsky also does telephone counseling of wom-
en who need advice about family law matters. She accepts these calls
one day a week, sometimes at her office.
Pinsky filed a request for permission to undertake the employ-
ment discrimination work in 1983. Since then she has continued to do
this work on an occasional basis. She does not file a new request for
permission for each matter. She knows of two others in her agency
who do this work, and reports that her agency is fairly relaxed about
such things. She uses her computer and her office phone for pro bono
work, and does a small amount of photocopying. Her pro bono work
has never interfered with her other responsibilities.
When asked why she does pro bono work, Pinsky said, "I can't
get paid to do the work I find meaningful; I didn't go to law school
to do [her bureaucratic government job] .... It's good to meet other
lawyers who have similar goals."
Joyce Koerner has been in the government for six years, and has
regularly represented plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases
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filed with administrative agencies.2' When asked why she does pro
bono work, Koerner just says she feels it is something she should do.
She handles about one case per year. For each, she requests permis-
sion from her division director, a personnel official, and notifies the
agency ethics officer. She has always been given permission, and
reports that her superiors have been quite supportive. She has not had
occasion to go to hearings, but has negotiated settlements with oppos-
ing counsel. She has never represented anyone who was suing the
government, but points out that, within her agency, she would be
permitted to represent agency employees in administrative hearings on
personnel matters.
Koerner reports that the forms she fills out require that she veri-
fy that she will not use government time or resources for her pro
bono work. She finds it impossible to comply fully with the regula-
tions, pointing out that one "can't call someone from a small firm at
nine at night at home." Also, she has used her computer for pro bono
documents and has done a small amount of copying.
Another lawyer, Henry Ackerman, worked at the Office of Immi-
gration Litigation of the Department of Justice from 1984 to 1986.
He said he did not do any pro bono work while he was there, but he
once tried to. He wanted to represent someone who had been arrested
during a demonstration at the South African Embassy. He asked per-
mission from his supervisor, who said he could not do it, because
those cases were being prosecuted by the Justice Department. He was
disappointed, but understood the reason for the decision. Ackerman
did not perceive any actual conflict between his work and his pro-
posed project, but acknowledged the concern with the appearance of a
conflict.
A few observations emerge from examination of these stories.
One is that the lawyers interviewed seem to be doing pro bono work
as an expression of deeply held values, aspirations, and political be-
liefs. Each works on issues that are personally important.297 Another
is that these lawyers comply with the regulations in different degrees,
296. As explained above, under 18 U.S.C. section 205, the U.S. waives the conflict of
interest inherent in a government lawyer's representing an employee against the agency that
employs the lawyer.
297. The work described appears to be the sort of political expression that is generally
regarded as protected by the first amendment of the United States Constitution. See In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (prohibiting a state from punishing a lawyer who, "seeking to
further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advis-
es a lay person of her legal rights" and offers free legal assistance in writing).
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depending on the attitude of the agency and the type of project. But
each seemed committed to not allow the pro bono work to interfere
with regular duties. All of them found it too difficult to comply with
the rigid prohibition on use of office resources for some part of the
work. Only one used more than a trivial amount of government time,
and none used more than a trivial amount of government resources
such as paper, electricity, telephone, and copying.
These stories place in sharp relief the two policy questions that
are central to this inquiry. The first is whether it is reasonable to
continue to regard pro bono representation of indigents in matters that
involve the government as presenting a conflict of interest for a fed-
eral government lawyer, even if the agency and the subject matter are
remote from the lawyer's normal duties. The second is whether there
is any reason to maintain regulations on use of time, space and re-
sources that are so restrictive that the norm is to violate them. On
both questions the law needs to be changed to correspond better with
reality.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Federal government policy should be revised to narrow the re-
strictions placed on uncompensated public service activity by employ-
ees of the government. The restrictions currently in place prohibit
more than is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the gov-
ernment, including avoidance of conflicts of interest and interference
with employees' performance of their official duties, and conservation
of federal resources. By narrowing the restrictions, the federal govern-
ment can allow those employees who wish to do so to make a contri-
bution to those in need in their communities, and can discard some
unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions on individual activity.
Much of the focus of this report has been on public service
activity by attorneys. Lawyers have a professional obligation to do
public service work that is not imposed on many other employees,
but the restrictions should be narrowed for all government employees,
not just the lawyers. Many non-lawyer employees wish to participate
in community service; there is no reason that lawyers should be privi-
leged to do so while other employees are not. It may be reasonable,
however, to give lawyers and other professionals a greater degree of
discretion about the use of time and resources for pro bono work
than is given to non-professional staff.
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A. Defining Permissible or Priority Pro Bono Work
Federal policy might encourage some types of service work and
discourage others by setting the restrictions in a manner that would
channel employees toward certain types of service activity. If, for
example, the government felt that services to the homeless were need-
ed, employees might be given wide latitude in this area.29
This type of channeling is a bad idea. The policies in question
deal with uncompensated activities undertaken by government employ-
ees on their own time. If the government wishes to encourage a par-
ticular type of public service, it should make that service part of the
official duties of some employees. This is done, for example, by
allowing administrative leave to those who represent other employees
in personnel proceedings.
In defining uncompensated public service activity, the federal
government should use an inclusive policy that lists all the public
service work in which its employees might wish to participate. The
Department of Justice regulations include such a definition:
(3) Public interest services should fall into one of the following
categories:
(i) Service to a client who does not have the financial
resources to pay for professional services;
(ii) Services to assert or defend individual or public rights
which society has a special interest in protecting;
(iii) Services to further the organizational purpose of a charita-
ble, religious, civic or educational organization; or
(iv) Services designed to improve the administration of jus-
tice.2'
298. Many federal agencies during the Bush administration have been actively engaged in
selecting and encouraging particular volunteer projects. These are mostly educational outreach
activities. The administration has not encouraged its lawyers to represent indigent individuals
or to work on law reform. Pergl, Reaching Out, Gov'T ExEcuTivE, Jan. 1991.
299. 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-9 (c)(3) (1990). The American Bar Association adopted a defini-
tion of public interest service in 1975, substantively similar to that listed above, which reads
as follows:
legal service provided without fee or at a substantially reduced fee, which falls
into one or more of the following areas:
1. Poverty Law: Legal services in civil and criminal matters of importance to a
client who does not have the financial resources to compensate counsel.
2. Civil Rights Law: Legal representation involving a right of an individual which
society has a special interest in protecting.
3. Public Rights Law: Legal representation involving an important right belonging
to a significant segment of the public.
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B. "Amendment of Section 205
The legislative history of section 205 reveals that the original
purpose of the law was to prohibit federal officials from lining their
pockets by abusing their positions to influence government decisions
about claims for money. When the law was enacted, lawyers did not
do pro bono service, except perhaps for a friend or a family member.
The law is being used for purposes that appear not to have been
intended by those who enacted the original statute or by those who
amended it.
Congress should reevaluate section 205 and should address di-
rectly the impact of the statute on public service work. In narrowing
the prohibitions of section 205, one proper line is the bright one of
compensation. If the outside activity is compensated, then the possi-
bility of impropriety is greater. If the service is voluntary, then the
presumption should be that the activity is altruistic rather than self-
interested, and the screen for conflicts should be narrower.
An expedient way to remove the inappropriate barriers to pro
bono work would be to amend section 205 to provide that employees
wishing to undertake uncompensated outside work are subject only to
the more limited restrictions presently imposed on special government
employees. This would prohibit government employees from acting as
agent or attorney for anyone in a matter in which the United States
was a party or had an interest, in a matter pending before the depart-
ment or agency in which the employee worked, or in a matter in
which the employee had participated personally and substantially. This
would retain a barrier to any activity in which a federal employee
was personally involved or might have some influence. Also, it would
address the appearance problem by barring a government employee
from representing a person in a pro bono matter before his own agen-
4. Charitable Organization Representation: Legal service to charitable, religious,
civil, governmental, and educational institutions in matters in furtherance of their
organizational purpose, where the payment of customary legal fees would signifi-
cantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inap-
propriate.
5. Administration of Justice: Activity, whether under bar association auspices, or
otherwise, which is designed to increase the availability of legal services, or other-
wise improve the administration of justice.
SPECIAL CommTr=E ON PUBLIC INTER.ST PRACTICE oF THE A.EMCAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ImmNTiNG THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATION app. at 19 (1977),
quoted in Lardent, supra note 6, at 84-85 n.20.
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cy.
Alternatively, section 205 could be changed to avoid unintended
and unnecessary restrictions on pro bono work simply by providing
that the law does not apply to uncompensated activity by attorneys.
This would mean that pro bono work would be governed by ethical
rules on conflicts of interest that apply to all attorneys, and by OPM
and agency regulations on outside activities. This option is less attrac-
tive than the first, because the first sets a federal statutory standard
applicable to all employees, not just lawyers. While the rules of pro-
fessional conduct are fairly specific on determination of conflicts of
interest, they vary from one state to another. Also, many states do not
delineate how a government lawyer should define her client.
Section 205 presently imposes an uneven screen for conflicts of
interest. While its coverage is overbroad in some respects, it is too
narrow in others. The definition of "covered matters" in the statute
should be broadened to include not only adversary adjudicative pro-
ceedings, but also advocacy directly adverse to the lawyer's agency in
a legislative or administrative forum as well. The possibility of actual
conflict of interest does not depend on the forum in which the dis-
pute takes place, but on who the parties are and what their interests
are.
The statute also should be amended to eliminate the distinction
between representation and assistance with representation. The only
logical basis for the exclusion of assistance short of representation
from the prohibitions contained in the current statute is that what is
being prohibited is activity that creates the appearance of a conflict
rather than an actual conflict. The primary concern should be with
actual conflicts. The absence of prohibition on assistance with repre-
sentation is a cavernous loophole that fails to prohibit much activity
that would involve an actual conflict of interest. Since the assistance
with representation most often would take place behind closed doors,
the participants are unlikely to be accountable to anyone other than
themselves, and the possibility of improper conduct is greater than in
public representational activity.
Section 205 prohibits only activity that is "[other] than in the
proper discharge of his official duties."3" A federal agency that
wished to encourage public service activity could avoid the prohibi-
tions of section 205 by making the pro bono representation of
300. 1 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
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indigents part of the official duties of the agency lawyers on the basis
that this work is part of their professional responsibility.
C. Changes in Regulation of Outside Activity
Section 205 imposes some restrictions on pro bono work by
federal government attorneys; OPM and agency regulations impose
additional restrictions. Each agency needs to revise its regulations on
outside activities to incorporate the changes recently made in section
205."° It is an appropriate time to reevaluate other restrictions as
well.
1. Flex-time
Even if the barrier of 205 is removed, most government lawyers
will not be allowed to do any pro bono work during regular business
hours unless they take annual leave. They would not be allowed to
make even the most perfunctory phone calls from their offices. Those
who endeavor to do some public service beyond their ordinary duties
must either suffer inconvenience and loss of vacation time as a result
of compliance with the regulations, or live with the anxiety attendant
to deliberate, albeit trivial, violations.
The absurdity of the current rules is evident from a quick glance
at the workday of a lawyer attempting to comply with those rules. A
dutiful government lawyer who wished to call her opposing counsel
during the day without violating the regulations might leave the office
during the half hour allowed for lunch, with her (privately purchased)
pen and pad in hand, and stand in a phone booth on the comer, hop-
ing that her adversary would return her call to the public phone with-
in the appropriate time. If she was fortunate enough to get through,
she would have to balance her pad against the wall of the phone
booth to make notes of the conversation. If the lawyer's office was
located near the D.C. bar office, she could make the call from an
office that the bar makes available for this purpose.
There is good reason not to challenge the limitations on use of
government time for non-official business. The use of official time
would involve a use of a significant amount of taxpayer dollars for a
private project.3 2 Current rules allow some uses of administrative
301. Some regulations track the language of the pre-amended section 205 in prohibiting
representation of anyone against the District of Columbia. If these are intended to implement
the statute, they should be revised to track its current language.
302. One could argue that a pro bono project, once approved, becomes a public project,
[Vol. 19:1141
PUBLIC SERVICE BY PUBLIC SERVAN7
leave for pro bono work, but restrict other uses. There is no need to
change the rules on administrative leave, because the less significant
adjustment in the rules on compensatory time would provide sufficient
flexibility to allow the performance of pro bono work.
Agency regulations should be amended to allow the use of infor-
mal compensatory time by lawyers doing pro bono projects. The
regulations should require lawyers doing pro bono work to maintain
records of time spent on such projects during official working hours,
and to expend that number of hours on official business outside of
regular working hours.3 3
2. Use of Resources
During the hearings in 1986 on the Kastenmeier bill to reduce
restrictions on pro bono work by government lawyers, a Congressman
asked a witness whether it would be permissible for a government
attorney to think about a pro bono project while sitting in his chair in
his government office. The witness responded that that would indeed
be a misallocation of government resources.3" On the one hand, it
is necessary to prevent the expenditure of government funds for pur-
poses other than those for which the money is authorized to be spent.
On the other hand, if the prohibition is absolute, government lawyers
are effectively prohibited from any outside public service activity.
but unless a government agency selects projects to offer its attorneys, the project is normally
selected by an individual attorney.
303. These regulations could set some reasonable limit on the period within which time
shifted would be required to be made up (e.g., a month). These regulations should not set a
maximum number of hours per week that may be spent on a pro bono project. Some pro
bono work involves litigation, so some cases might require a few consecutive days. The
official duties of government lawyers vary; some would not be able to accept a matter that
might require a large block of consecutive hours, but others could shift their work to the
following week without negative consequences.
304. Congressman Kastenmeier posed the following question to David Martin, the Direc-
tor of the U.S. Office of Government Ethics:
It is all right you say if the Federal employee is on flextime or whatever and is
sitting in his chair, a Government-owned chair at a Government-owned desk, using
them on his own time thinking about . . . [his pro bono matter].
Mr. Martin responded:
Well, Maybe that was a misstatement. I don't think any facility or equipment
should be used by an employee for pro bono services in any manner that is not
pursuant to his duties.. . . [A]lcohol and gasoline don't mix.
Pro Bono Representation by Employees of the Federal Government and the District of
Columbia, Hearing on H.R 4898 Before the House Subcomminee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1986) (Statement of David
Martin).
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There are many uses of federal resources that have little or no cost,
such as use of books and office space, making of local phone calls,
use of typewriters and computers, and use of pens, paper and copiers.
These involve some costs; electricity to light the room and run the
equipment, wear on equipment and furniture, and use of paper, ink,
and other supplies. The cost involved is very small, however; the
regulations might prohibit uses beyond a certain amount.
Allowing the use of minimal amounts of resources for pro bono
work might result in a savings in federal resources. If, for example,
the employee did not leave the office to go to the phone booth, her
official work would be less disrupted. Some of the time spent leaving
to do a task on a pro bono project could be devoted to regular re-
sponsibilities. Many employees' job satisfaction and productivity
would rise as a result of greater diversity in their work. Increased job
satisfaction might result in a longer stay in a federal position, and a
correspondingly greater contribution to the institution. Especially in
light of the current difficulty faced by the federal government in
recruiting good lawyers,'05 the government should undertake to pay
more attention to its human resources than to its paper clips.
The regulations should allow the use of offices, desks, comput-
ers, telephones (for local calls), and small amounts of supplies, such
as paper, pens, and staples. Lawyers who need more significant re-
sources to represent clients effectively should be encouraged to con-
sult with their supervisors, who would determine whether the govern-
ment could provide any of the needed assistance.
3. Screening Process
Each agency should continue to require (or initiate a process for)
advance approval of any representational project in which the govern-
ment attorney would be counsel of record or would have significant
responsibility. This would allow agency officials to screen for con-
flicts of interest and to assess the amount of time likely to be re-
quired by each pro bono project. Non-representational activities cur-
rently are subject to fewer restrictions. Careful screening is necessary
before a lawyer undertakes representation of a client because of possi-
ble conflicts and because of the legal responsibility that follows ac-
305. Report: High Turnover for Federal Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 1990, at 7 (re-
porting on a series of reports from the Merit Systems Protection Board, which indicate that
lawyers have one of the highest rates of turnover among professionals in the government, and
that the salary disparity between the public and private sectors is greatest for lawyers).
[Vol. 19:1141
PUBLIC SERVICE BY PUBLIC SERVANTS
ceptance of a client.
Proposed pro bono projects should be screened only for conflicts
of interest and time conflicts. Agencies should not assess the desir-
ability of the objective of the project, as long as it does not present a
conflict with the work of the agency. To the extent that the federal
government has imposed a particular political ideology on its employ-
ees through restrictions on pro bono work, this practice should termi-
nate. Federal government attorneys who wish to undertake advocacy
of unpopular causes, or objectives that are not shared by their super-
visors, should be permitted to do so. Government employees should
not be required to forfeit rights of association or expression unless
their activities conflict with their work responsibilities.
In addition to individual screening, an agency might pre-approve
a list of categories of projects that had been screened for conflicts
and for likely time demands.3 °6 A general counsel's office might
establish a relationship with a service organization whose work would
present no conflicts with the work of the agency. This would allow
the lawyers in the office to share pro bono projects, which would
reduce time conflicts, and would reduce screening time. Some types
of activity might be generally permitted, such as attendance at bar
association meetings, or meetings of other law reform organizations.
If agencies pre-approve certain projects, they should take care not to
direct the employees to particular substantive work or discourage
other non-conflicting work. This is a choice for the employees to
make.
4. Use of Secretaries
As lawyers have shifted from typewriters to computers, their
dependency on secretaries has dropped dramatically. Many lawyers
could handle the paperwork for a pro bono case as easily without as
with a secretary. There are, however, some lawyers who still make
extensive use of secretaries. This discussion of secretarial assistance
might apply equally to assistance that lawyers might request from
other government employees, such as librarians, paralegals, or others.
It can be argued that secretaries who work for the government
306. The current regulations on outside activities vary from agency to agency. In most
respects it would be desirable to have one government-wide policy on attorney pro bono
work. Each agency, however, would need to select its own projects for pre-approval, because
the different functions of the agencies would create different possible conflicts of interest for
each.
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should be able to volunteer to assist lawyers in pro bono efforts
during non-work hours."° But both of these issues present greater
possible problems of line-drawing and abuse than do the proposals to
allow use of compensatory time and minimal uses of resources for
pro bono work. The issue of the use of secretaries is complicated by
the hierarchical nature of the relationship, which would make it diffi-
cult for some secretaries to turn down requests for voluntary assis-
tance."°8 Since secretarial assistance is not essential to the perfor-
mance of pro bono work,3" it is preferable to avoid the adoption of
a policy that would risk lawyers' making inappropriate demands on
their secretaries.
The regulations should prohibit lawyers from asking secretaries
to work on pro bono projects during official work hours. They should
be silent as to arrangements regarding non-work hours. To prohibit a
secretary from participation in a pro bono project during off-duty
hours would be at least paternalistic and possibly an infringement of
the right to free association.
5. Training and Malpractice Insurance
Most lawyers cannot undertake pro bono representation of a
client without training. Lawyers are no longer generalists-each area
of law must be learned. Since training usually is a prerequisite to
performance of pro bono work, informal compensatory time should be
equally available for attendance at training and for subsequent repre-
sentational activities.
In addition, the government should encourage those employees
307. Some secretaries are not busy all the time and could assist on pro bono matters on
government time without displacing other work. But this raises the specter of the use of
significant government resources for other than official purposes. If one were to change the
regulations on use of secretaries, it would be far less controversial to limit the proposal to
permit such assistance on their own time.
308. The supervising attorney might have significant influence on the secretaries' opportu-
nities for promotions and pay increases. Even if the performance of extra duties were formal-
ly excluded from consideration, many secretaries would worry (and some with good reason)
that turning down requests for assistance with pro bono projects would make their supervisors
value them less.
309. This assertion assumes that government lawyers' principal responsibilities would limit
them, as a practical matter, either to representation of clients in "small" cases (consumer,
domestic relations, landlord-tenant, etc.), or to handling a limited portion of a larger matter
that was being handled primarily by another attorney. The finite amount of time available
makes the need for secretarial help less. If a project needs extensive support assistance, it is
one that should have the participation of a non-governmental organization, so that those ser-
vices can be paid for by other than taxpayer dollars.
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who undertake representational pro bono work to do so through an
organization whose malpractice policy governs its volunteer attorneys.
D. Relative Priority of Regulatory and Statutory Change
One question is the relative priority of changing section 205 and
changing the agency regulations. Section 205 imposes a barrier to the
representation of individuals in cases involving the United States. The
Office of Personnel Management and the agencies impose barriers to
pro bono work by limiting leave available to perform pro bono work,
by prohibiting use of any government resources, and other regulatory
barriers.
If the vast majority of needed legal services or the most urgently
needed services are in the federal entitlements area or in other matters
in which the U.S. is a party or has an interest, then the amendment
of section 205 is essential to help meet this need. If, on the other
hand, only a small proportion of the urgently needed work involves
the federal government as a party, one might conclude that section
205 is not as significant as the regulatory barriers to the accomplish-
ment of important service.
The resources of the Legal Services Corporation are spread so
thin and the unmet client needs are so vast that perhaps volunteer
lawyers should be directed to those problems that are most pressing
or most critical. 10 This paper recommends that the federal govern-
ment permit pro bono work and that the government not attempt to
channel lawyers into particular pro bono projects. However, in appris-
ing its lawyers of pro bono opportunities, the federal government
might wish to make special efforts to provide information about need-
ed service that might save a life or a livelihood.31
A majority of federal government lawyers work in the District of
Columbia." 2 Imani Woody, of the D.C. Bar Public Service Activi-
310. See Tull, Implications of Emerging Substantive Issues for the Delivery System for
Legal Services for the Poor, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 17, 24 (1990).
311. In general, pro bono assistance has not been organized with the goal of providing
for critical unmet needs. At present, there are almost 600 pro bono referral programs in exis-
tence in the United States, but they tend to try to refer a maximum number of cases to a
maximum number of attorneys, without placing priority on particular types of cases. See
generally THE MARRERRO REPORT, supra note 69 at 771. Perhaps such an effort would turn
out to be futile because of the relatively small proportion of unmet needs that could be satis-
fied by any pro bono initiative. But if some jurisdictions require pro bono service by all
attorneys, it may be possible for the first time to set coherent policy in the allocation of
volunteer lawyers, and to have some impact on the unmet service needs of some communi-
ties.
312. In 1985, there were 20,310 lawyers employed by the federal government; 11,360
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ties Corporation, reported that most of the calls to the D.C. Bar Re-
ferral Service requesting pro bono assistance were for help with do-
mestic relations problems. Other commonly requested services include,
among others, public benefits, criminal defense, immigration, landlord-
tenant, mediation, and employment law. Of these, usually domestic
relations and landlord-tenant cases involve no significant federal inter-
est. The criminal, immigration, and some public benefits cases do
involve federal interests.
The 1980 Annual Report of the Legal Services Corporation indi-
cates that the primary subjects of representation in legal services
offices are family law (30.3%), housing law (17.6%), income mainte-
nance (17.2%), and consumer finance (13.7%).313 This list does not
indicate what services are needed that are not provided. It does not
indicate in what percentage of each category the federal government
has an interest. But one can guess that the federal government has no
interest in the family cases, most of the housing cases, or the con-
sumer cases. Income maintenance may include welfare, social security
and other public benefits programs, so some of those cases would
involve federal entitlements. This list excludes criminal cases altogeth-
er, because the Legal Services Corporation does not fund representa-
tion of criminal defendants. As to civil cases, it suggests that the
federal government is a party to only a small percentage. If the pool
of needed civil representation corresponds to the work being done by
legal services offices, then the barriers imposed by section 205 are
less significant than the other regulatory barriers to the performance
of pro bono work in general.314 As to criminal cases, except in the
were in the District of Columbia. B. CuRRAN, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT. THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1985 3, 33 (1986).
313. The other listed categories, which represented a small percentage of the representa-
tion, were "miscellaneous" (11.7%), employment (3.1%), individual rights (2.9%), juvenile
(.9%), education (.5%), and health (.2%). Id
314. Another source of information about demand for services by indigents is a pilot
study done in New Jersey by the National Social Science and Law Center. Two hundred and
thirty-six low income adults were asked over 300 questions about their civil legal needs.
Almost seventy percent of the households studied had at least one legal problem, and 13
percent had ten or more problems. They averaged four legal problems per household during a
one year period. The 939 problems reported were of the following types:
Municipal services 19.9%
Public Benefits 19.3%
Housing 19.0%
Consumer and Utility 13.8%
Health, Education, Family 12.5%
Employment 8.1%
[VCol. 19:1141
PUBLIC SERVICE BY PUBLIC SERVANTS
District of Columbia, section 205 would prohibit federal government
attorneys from accepting only federal criminal cases, which are a
small proportion of the number of criminal cases prosecuted.
These figures suggest that a significant proportion of the unmet
need for legal services involves matters in which the United States is
a party or has an interest. The need for service is so enormous that
no lawyer seeking a pro bono assignment would be unable to find
one on account of the barrier imposed by section 205. On the other
hand, many indigent clients might benefit from the amendment of 205
to make the federal government lawyer's client his agency. Especially
because so many government lawyers' work involves administrative
law, these lawyers might be more adept than private practitioners in
handling public benefits and other federal administrative matters. The
service that is prohibited might be the most useful service that gov-
ernment lawyers could provide.
The limited data available suggest that the restrictions imposed
by the agencies pose more serious barriers than does section 205 to
pro bono activity, but that both statutory and regulatory changes are
needed to bring the law back in touch with reality. The new OPM
policy and the 1989 amendments to 18 U.S.C. section 205 represent
important steps in that direction. If other federal officials show similar
understanding of lawyers' obligations to assist the disadvantaged, this
progress will continue.
Environment 6.3%
Miscellaneous 1%
Legal Needs of the Poor: A New Report from the National Social Science and Law Center,
20 CLEANGHOUSE REV. 1291 (Feb. 1987), (reporting on "A Preliminary Report on a Study
of the Legal Needs of the Poor in New Jersey," prepared by the National Social Science &
Law Center). On this list, again, the public benefits category is the only one likely to include
a significant number of cases in which the federal government is a party or has an interest.
1991]

